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A young man on his way home from a night on the town wanders around underneath 
a streetlight. He is seen by a policeman who approaches the young man and asks,
“ What are you doing? ”
The young man replies, “I ’m looking fo r my wallet ”.
The policeman asks, “ Where did you lose it? ”
The young man replies, “About two blocks back”.
Confused the policeman then asks, “So why are you looking fo r it here? ”
The young man looks at the policeman and says, “Because there ’s light ”.
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C h a p t e r  1 : terra nullius SOCIAL POLICY
Over the last twenty-five years, Aboriginal affairs have been the recipient of 
substantial monetary assistance from the public purse. Throughout this period, 
programs designed to redress social and economic disparities between black and white 
Australians have been initiated by federal, state and territory governments. In 
conjunction with these strategies, new arrangements of Aboriginal representation to 
all levels of government and their agents have also evolved. As a result of these 
changing administrative relationships, the Aboriginal role has emerged from that of 
isolated recipient of bureaucratic process to intimate participation with decision­
making responsibilities in the administration itself.
This continuing, albeit gradual process of review in the administration of Aboriginal 
affairs, has led to major administrative reforms and efforts. In more recent times 
these include National Park Joint Management Committees, establishment of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families and Reconciliation. With 
some pressure from the international community, these measures reflect changing 
societal values and responsiveness to the aspirations and roles that Aboriginal people 
are demanding for themselves.
Despite this attention, the repertoire of social ills confronting Aboriginal people still 
mirror those of the past compounded by the addition of many ‘contemporary’ issues. 
This situation has led to frequent reviews of programs, structures and policy platforms
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articulated by governments at all levels in their collective response to the ‘Aboriginal’ 
problem. However, how have these reviews contributed towards understanding past 
and current initiatives? The continuing shortfall in policy outcomes would indicate 
that very little has been learnt. John Hewson summed up this disillusionment,
In the past 15 years the Government has probably spent $17-18 billion. Yet 
the improvement in Aboriginal health, education, housing and employment 
has fallen way short of reasonable expectation. Although there have been 
audits of some programs, of ATSIC and of some Land Councils, there has not 
been a satisfactory explanation as to why, that’s to the satisfaction of both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians.1
Such comments, of course, are not surprising given the diverse range of opinions 
amongst ‘interested stakeholders’, Aboriginal people included, about howto alleviate 
popular descriptions o f ‘Aboriginal disadvantage’, welfare dependency and 
underlying issues as described by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody. Collectively, attempts to understand the reasons for policy failings have 
developed around notions of inadequate resources, poor administrative practice or the 
imposition of multi-layered administrative controls of accountability to government. 
More recently, self-determination is being questioned as a failing policy and welfare 
dependency has re-emerged. But does the collective content of these arguments 
enhance the understanding of issues confronting Aboriginal people and the apparent 
lack of success by public policy responses to them? Or do they more accurately 
reflect re-runs of the same ideological statements from both the Right, and the Left as 
well as the security and comfort in their own ‘feel good’ rhetoric?
In this dissertation I argue that Australia’s administration of Aboriginal Affairs since
1 Hewson, J. “Take the thorny road to reconciliation”, Financial Review, 23rd October 1998 p.41
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1897 has operated from a premise of non-recognition under policies of assimilation. 
The term I use to describe this administration is terra nullius social policy. The term 
refers to the context in which Aboriginal people and issues confronting them are 
considered. I demonstrate that the values that ground Australian political culture, 
institutions and administrative structures consider Aboriginal people in an ‘all 
australian’ context, rather than a context that recognises their status as Aboriginal 
people. From this premise, I analyse the application of terra nullius in administrative 
practices to refer to the subject of the phrase, the “no-one”.
In the administrative application of terra nullius social policy, it is argued and 
demonstrated that government initiatives have merely undergone technical 
adjustments designed to retain assimilationist practices, rather than advance the 
recognition of Aboriginal people in Australia as Aboriginal people. Under the ‘flat 
iron’ of Australian egalitarianism, the rhetoric of equality and ‘all australians’ has 
persistently circumscribed the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people. In terms of agenda and policy, non-Aboriginal values, perspectives and 
assumptions dominate and control the power of definition. This domination has 
characterised Aboriginal relations with the state through the colonial experience, 
federation and contemporary practices. However, the most significant ‘change’ in this 
relationship is the co-optation of Aboriginal people into non-Aboriginal 
administrative structures on the assumption that such mechanisms can adequately 
accommodate Aboriginal rights and interests.
Since the 1970s the experience in Aboriginal affairs has been to gradually maximise 
the participation of Aboriginal people into mainstream administrative structures. This
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participation has modeled new approaches not only in the way Aboriginal interests are 
mobilised amongst themselves, but also to government. With this practice the onus 
for change falls upon Aboriginal people. The fixed element in this approach is that 
institutions in which Aboriginal people are encouraged to participate do not 
structurally change. That is, the values, which underlie the design and determine the 
outcomes of these structures, have been retained. Any administrative adjustments 
adapted to accommodate new participatory arrangements are purely technical. At the 
end of it all, Aboriginal people are still dealing with institutions and processes that are 
imposed. Not only are these institutions and processes inadequate to Aboriginal 
culture and experience, they perpetuate the process of colonisation. The mechanism 
through which this domination is currently maintained is the participatory fora of a 
managerialist model of public administration. Although these fora represent a shift 
from an earlier model, which operated in a context of conflict, to a model that now 
operates in a context o f ‘consensus’, the administrative practice of terra nullius in 
social policy prevails.
These processes are consistent with models identified by Boldt as practices of both 
institutional and internal assimilation.2 The intention of these models is to process 
Aboriginal people through the application and operation of mainstream administrative 
institutions. It involves the establishment of Aboriginal organisations and forums, 
which are seen by government agencies to represent the views and concerns of 
Aboriginal people about specific issues. The participation of Aboriginal people in 
these structures primarily serves to legitimate bureaucratic involvement in Aboriginal 
communities. A secondary element is that such participation confirms the
2 Boldt, M. Governments in conflict?: provinces and Indian nations in Canada, University o f Toronto 
Press, Toronto. 1988
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appropriateness and acceptance by Aboriginal people that such frameworks can assist 
in the positive promotion of Aboriginal interests.
The reality of these impositions is that they polarise the Aboriginal community to 
ensure easier access for governments and their agents to manage Aboriginal issues. 
They implant white middle management structures between governments and 
Aboriginal communities thus serving to establish an agency’s own set o f ‘experts’, a 
trend in Aboriginal involvement with bureaucracies since the Whitlam Government.
Government
Community
It is a process that can be described as an ‘unholy trinity’; an agenda that aims to 
control, contain and manage Aboriginal affairs. It can be concluded then, that 
processes which set out to establish middle management structures to serve the 
functional interests of funding agencies, only succeed in establishing an Aboriginal 
polity which they can identify, because they do not understand the one that already 
exists.
Kwame Dawes speaking out about cultural appropriation in relation to funding 
agencies that provide support to artists in Canada comments;
This mainstream network of funding agencies persists with a conservatism that 
shies from any fundamental philosophical or structural change, opting instead 
for a mechanism that is able to absorb new ideas and new ways of approaching
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certain issues within the already existing structure. And herein lies the reality 
that non-white peoples are in no way gaining a significant power base in these 
organisations. The fact is that the hierarchical structures continues to produce 
and implement policies that suit its own interests while using tried and proven 
strategies of divide and conquer to disarm the call for fundamental change that 
is coming from non-white groups all over the country, and from the non-white 
individuals who are coopted into the system.3
By using their ‘experts’, funding agencies do not feel the need to consult with the 
community at large. They can legitimate their involvement and accountability needs 
by consulting with middle management structures they themselves have established.
Aboriginal people, who are now mediators of this new model, then impose the 
rhetorical assumptions and definitions of government upon Aboriginal communities. 
This evolution is described as internal assimilation, where the definitions and 
characteristics of Aboriginal people, so often described from a white perspective, are 
being imposed by Aboriginal people themselves. This is the modern expression of 
terra nullius. The benefit of this practice is that it insulates government by providing 
an effective shield from the scrutiny and demands of Aboriginal people on the outer 
of this interface. In so doing, a buffer between Aboriginal people and government is 
established. This strategy has been successful in establishing an effective ‘comfort 
zone’ created by a public relations exercise under the guise of Aboriginal 
empowerment. Although this public image of government ‘isolation’ and ‘non­
interference’ provides a powerful symbolic image, its reality however is 
assimilationist, a means of consolidating the myth of terra nullius.
In the application of participatory models, Aboriginal input is limited not by default, 
but by design. Aboriginal input is limited because representation must be consistent
3 “Re-Appropriating Cultural Appropriation”, Fuse Magazine. Vol. 16 No. 5 & 6, Summer 1993 p.8
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with the parameters in which these mechanisms operate. This is ‘censorship’ at 
source because the context in which representation occurs cannot receive and 
articulate the voice of Aboriginal autonomy.
Aboriginal participation in non-Aboriginal jurisdictions
This fact alone is a clear indication that the authority managing these processes exists 
at a higher level than that of the participants. Despite this acknowledged deficiency, 
often described in statements such as: ‘they still don’t listen’, Aboriginal 
representation continues to utilise these processes to promote the interests of 
Aboriginal people. These measures of containment exist in the form of legislative 
frameworks that drive the operations of such fora. The establishment of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Aboriginal Justice Advisory 
Committees, and National Park Joint Management Committees are not intended to 
legitimate Aboriginal knowledge and values, rather, they are designed to impose the 
image of the ‘other’. The voice of Aboriginal people operating in these fora does not 
reflect the voice that speaks from the position of Aboriginal autonomy, but from the 
voice of the prompter.
Because the emphasis of critique and accountability is situated in the application of 
practice and not in the location of context, questioning the values underpinning
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Australia’s political and administrative institutions is non-existent in the explanation 
for failed policy. Consequently, problem identification processes and outcome 
evaluation methods utilised by administrative practices have failed to recognise that 
values promote assumptions. These assumptions not only influence how we 
understand problems but how we then approach searching for a solution. In other 
words, values provide a context for the explanation of the social fabric.
Political culture and political institutions reinforce these explanations. Galligan 
describes political culture as
encompassing the set of shared ideas, assumptions, preferences and customs 
that are usually taken for granted in a political system but are essential to its 
operation. Political culture is reflected in the design and functioning of 
political institutions, and is a significant factor in accounting for political 
habits and rhetoric.4
The exclusion of values in determining ‘problems’ and in the evaluation of public 
policy efforts, contrasts with the findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody
.. it is deceptive indeed to assume that ‘colonial Australia’ ended with the 
coming of the twentieth century, or that successful British settlement meant 
the end o f ‘colonialistic’ relations between Aboriginal people and non- 
Aboriginal people. These relations were entrenched not only by acts of 
dispossession but also by a wide variety of ideas, beliefs, and economic, legal, 
political and social structures which institutionalized and perpetuated them.5
This description by the Royal Commission illustrates the structural deficiencies in 
mainstream institutions to issues confronting Aboriginal people. The comments
4 Galligan, B. “Political Culture and institutional design” Towards an Australian Bill o f Rights, (ed) 
Phillip Alston Centre for International and Public Law, Australian National University Canberra and 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Sydney. 1994 p.58
5 Roval Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1991, Vol. 2 Ch.10 p.5
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explicitly relate structures to values. That is, the cultural assumptions and values that 
direct a particular view of society predicate institutions.
According to the Royal Commission, past policies in Aboriginal affairs were 
premised by the belief that is was appropriate to confer mainstream values upon 
Aboriginal people. It is unfortunate however, that these views are expressed in the 
past tense. Unfortunate, because such views promote the assumption that the values, 
which shaped past Australian legal, political and social structures, are not currently 
reinforced in contemporary institutions. This is a misconception. The promotion of 
egalitarianism in white Australian culture is not a contemporary phenomenon. As a 
value to preserve and protect it is well embedded in Australian political thought. 
Despite its ageing influence it is just as prominent now as it was in shaping Australia 
federation. To think of values purely in the linear measurements described by the 
Royal Commission, produces a common flaw in current evaluation and problem- 
identification processes. That is, in the attempt to find solutions to the range of issues 
confronting Aboriginal people, there is a tendency to respond to the symbolic image 
represented by these values rather than the context in which they are played out. 
Clearly then, attention to the procedural mechanisms of program delivery will offer 
little assistance to redressing these structural deficiencies. However, this focus is very 
effective at directing responses towards symptoms rather than causes. Current 
evaluation and problem-identification practices consider Australian political culture 
an irrelevant influence in the methods used to identify problems, propose solutions 
and evaluate policy outcomes in Aboriginal Affairs. On the contrary, the values that 
shape this culture are an integral point of reference that is excluded in such exercises.
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The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody articulated such a 
framework. The Royal Commission identified the systemic influences shaping 
contemporary Aboriginal circumstance by providing an overview of Australia’s 
administration in Aboriginal Affairs. This overview placed particular emphasis on 
causality and structural characteristics. The Royal Commission concluded that 
independent issues such as unemployment, land, substance abuse and education were 
all inter-related and that no one particular issue held a determining influence in 
shaping contemporary circumstances for Aboriginal people in Australia.6
To understand the systemic influences, there is a need to identify how these issues are 
inter-related and how such influences are maintained. The Royal Commission 
recognised these influences as products of assimilationist policies, which in turn were 
products of an historical process of disempowerment. This process of 
disempowerment is a product of non-recognition by colonial and Australian 
Governments at both Commonwealth and State levels to recognise Aboriginal people 
as Aboriginal people and respond to Aboriginal needs and issues within this context.




6 Roval Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1991 Vol.4 Ch. 26 p. 3
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It is these aspects which the Royal Commission identifies as systemic influences.
The great lesson that stands out is that non-Aboriginals who currently hold 
virtually all the power in dealing with Aboriginals, have to give up the usually 
well-intentioned efforts to do things for or to Aboriginals, to give up the 
assumption that they know what is best for Aboriginals... who have to be led, 
educated, manipulated and re-shaped into the image of the dominant 
community. Instead Aboriginals must be recognised for what they are, a 
people in their own right with their own culture, history, values...
This connection between structural deficiencies and values should be paramount in 
the evaluation of public policy in Aboriginal affairs. Australia’s political and 
administrative structures are themselves products of design to ensure that specific 
outcomes are produced. These outcomes are determined by the values that shape 
Australian political culture. To alter the structures that Aboriginal people are 
encouraged to participate in, requires more than just a change in process, procedure, 
regulation or legislation. Fundamentally, it requires a change in the context in which 
Aboriginal people and the issues impacting upon them are viewed. These views were 
expressed by Justice Mathews in the 1996 Report to Senator John Herron regarding 
the Hindmarsh application for protection, which comments;
The events precipitated by the bridge proposal have thus far revealed many 
deficiencies in Commonwealth laws designed to preserve and protect areas 
and objects of traditional Aboriginal significance... Some are attributable to 
poor drafting of the legislation.. .However the most pervasive of the 
deficiencies is much more difficult to rectify than a piece of legislation. It 
reflects the fundamental differences between the introduced common law 
system and the legal system of the indigenous oral culture. This latest episode 
in the Hindmarsh Island bridge saga has provided graphic illustration as to 
how little our apparently beneficial heritage legislation has accommodated to 
the realities of Aboriginal culture.7 8
It is the nature of the relationship between Aboriginal people and government that
7 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Regional Report on Inquiry in New South 
Wales. Victoria and Tasmania. 1991. p. 29
8 Commonwealth Hindmarsh Island Report, 27th June 1996 p. 1
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requires evaluation not just the mechanisms of participatory models that sustain 
existing and past practices. In particular, the frames of reference used to identify ‘the 
problem’, as identified by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 
requires further consideration. Despite experience and many official government 
reports, it would appear that the confusion surrounding the differentiation between 
causes and symptoms still remains. Fundamentally, mainstream methods of policy 
analysis have neglected to question the values that underpin Australia’s political and 
administrative institutions. In 1992 the legal fiction of terra nullius was buried by the 
Australian High Court in relation to land and settlement. Unfortunately, Australia's 
political institutions, administrative structures and practices in Aboriginal affairs have 
been unable to lose that history in social policy.
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Chapter 2  : P olicy E valuation
Values are like marked trails in the wilderness. Afraid of getting lost, we often 
neglect to take the less-travelled road and then tend to forget that someone did 
the marking for us, thus implanting his or her ideas as to what was worth 
exploring, at what effort and risk 7
The process of Reconciliation is attempting to promote a whole new approach to the 
way in which we view the past and present relationships between Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal Australians. It is a process supported by the Australian government, 
which passed The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act in 1991. Bill 
Hollingsworth described this process as consisting of three basic elements: to 
encourage people to understand and reassess the past, to dissolve prejudice and 
arrogance by educating Australians about Aboriginal culture and achievements, and to 
bring about an understanding of the unique position of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples as the Aboriginal peoples of Australia.9 10 But by whose philosophies 
of recognition and equity is this new perspective to be framed? Is Australia sincere as 
a nation to recognise Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people, or is it just a ‘feel good’ 
exercise for mainstream Australia?
Since the re-election of the Howard Government in 1999 there have been frequent 
public commitments affirming the process of reconciliation. These commitments 
encompass an acknowledgment of mistakes colonial and Australian governments have 
made in responding to issues impacting upon Aboriginal people. As commented by 
various Ministers, these mistakes are framed in an historical context that situates
9 Dery, D. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis, University Press of Kansas, 1984, p.116
10 Hollingsworth, B. “Self-Determination and Reconciliation” in Aboriginal Self-determination in 
Australia (ed) Christine Fletcher Aboriginal Studies Press Canberra 1994 p. 57
16
‘mistakes’ to the early periods of dispossession and marginalisation that occurred. As 
commented by Senator John Herron, ‘you’ve got to put the past behind you’. 11 Such 
attitudes conflict with the theory of public policy evaluation. If the intention of public 
policy evaluation is the improvement of policymaking, then an understanding of how 
the present was created is essential. 12
The evaluation of government policy plays a vital role within the public policy cycle. 
Primarily, the overall effect of the evaluation stage is to ensure government 
accountability by analysing the effectiveness of government policy. This enables 
government to study whether or not a particular policy is meeting its stated objectives. 
That is, government and the public may be placed in a position to examine, and 
possibly confirm, whether the policy strategies are consistent with the policy 
objectives.
However, the importance of evaluation is not limited to reporting on the impact of 
policy. Recommendations that may result from the evaluation stage have influence 
upon other stages within the public policy cycle such as problem identification, policy 
formulation and policy implementation. Evaluation can have this effect because it 
operates and introduces another perspective, that is, praxis. The evaluation stage 
addresses the working reality of a policy as it flows through the machinery of 
government, reaches the target group and assesses the effects of that policy on the 
particular group.
11 McCabe, H. “Heron vows to never say sorry”, The Daily Telegraph, 23rd October 1998, p. 2
12 Anderson, C.W. “Political Philosophy, Practical Reason, and Policy Analysis” in Confronting Values 
in Policy Analysis, (eds) Frank Fischer & John Forester, Sage Publications. 1987 p.22
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Critical to the evaluation process is the distinction between policy outputs and policy 
impact. Policy outputs relate to the observable indicators of what it is that 
governments do. Policy impact refers to the extent to which a policy output has 
accomplished its stipulated goals. 13 Consequently, interrelated methods of evaluation 
research have emerged from this distinction.
To successfully contribute in the public policy cycle, evaluation activities must be 
organised around the four questions of what, how, when and by whom evaluation 
should be conducted.14 However, even before commencing evaluation activities, it is 
important to remove as many assumptions as possible from the process. A prevailing 
myth among many laypersons is that once government sets its mind to do something 
and allocates sufficient funds, its goals will be achieved - at least in great part.15 
Assumptions must first be identified as assumptions.
Such an opportunity exists in policy evaluation. Policy evaluation attempts to assess 
the impact of a program or policy on the problem. 16 May describes this method as 
policy learning. 17 As argued by Howlett and Ramish, the greatest benefit of policy 
evaluation is not the direct results that it generates but the process of policy learning 
that accompanies it. Nachmias argues,
At the heart of all policy evaluation research activities is the idea of causality;
13 Nachmias, D. Public Policy Evaluation Approaches and Methods, St Martins Press New York 1979
14 Hasan, A. “Evaluation Of Employment, Training And Social Programmes: An Overview Of Issues”, 
in Evaluating Labour Market And Social Programmes. OECD Paris 1991.
15 Nachmias, D. Public Policy Evaluation Approaches and Methods. St Martins Press New York 1979
p. 2
16 Bridgman, P. &Davis, G. Australian Policy Handbook. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin 1998 and 
Bingham, R. & Felbinger, C. Evaluation in Practice: A Methodological Approach. Longman new York, 
1989.
17 May, P. “Policy Learning and Failure” , Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 12 No.4 1992
18 Howlett, M. & Ramesh, M. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1995 p. 170
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that is, a policy is expected to produce a change in the target population in the 
direction and of the magnitude intended by the policy makers.19
However, it should not be assumed that policy evaluation methods would expose 
structural weaknesses if policy goals and objectives are maintained as the benchmark 
for evaluation. Policy makers may learn that a certain program does or does not 
achieve certain objectives, but how would this inform policy makers about the 
adequacy of the objectives being pursued?20 While it may create opportunities for 
changes relating to processes and people, structural impediments may be largely 
ignored. Underpinning these assumptions is the methodology used to define the 
problem. All policy analysis methodologies contain certain assumptions about what 
issues are worth analyzing, what facts are important to look at, what the public good 
consists of, and so on, and all of these assumptions result in giving a normative slant 
to the final policy recommendations. To be clear, the argument here is not that 
analysts may be personally biased but that the analytic methodologies themselves
Anderson argues that because policy analysis derives from political philosophy, it is 
relativistic and contextual. It is an argument consistent with Galligan’s description 
of political culture and its influence in the design of administrative structures. To 
further illustrate these two points, Australia’s political philosophy is grounded in a 
liberal democratic tradition. The major political protagonists of this tradition are
19 Nachmias, D. Public Policy Evaluation Approaches and Methods, St Martins Press New York 1979 
P- 7
0 Dery, D. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. University Press of Kansas, 1984, p. 115
21 Amy, D. J. “Can Policy Analysis Be Ethical”, in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis (eds) Fischer, 
F. & Forester, J. Sage Publications 1987, p. 49
22 Anderson, C. W. “Political Philosphy, Practical Reason, and Policy Analysis” in Confronting Values 
in Policy Analysis (eds) Fischer, F. & Forester, J. Sage Publications 1987, p. 26
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represented by the political Left and Right of Australian politics. Although the 
various political parties in Australia present alternative reform models to redress the 
‘Aboriginal problem’, these proposed reforms are limited by the liberal democratic 
tradition that bound them.
The critical point here is the context within which problem definition occurs. If the 
task of the policy analyst is to formulate the problem, the context within which this 
formulation occurs impacts on the kinds of solutions proposed. While there are 
differences and varied forms of policy analysis, these differences occur within a 
shared philosophical context. This is consistent with open systems of policy analysis 
where external influences or differences have opportunities for expression. That is, in 
open systems it should always be possible to end up somewhere other than where one 
began.23
Establishing this discourse is, however, problematic due to the many dimensions of 
public administration. Esman discusses the multi-dimensional aspects of public 
administration in influencing social, political and cultural perspectives within society 
grouping them into major categories such as economic growth, equity, capacity, and 
empowerment.24 These dimensions are consistent with the administrative theory of 
Bjur and Zomorrodian.25 They define administrative theory as referring to the 
conceptual descriptions of how the administrative system is organised, how functional 
roles and relationships are defined within the institutions responsible for achieving
23 Amy, D. J. “Can Policy Analysis Be Ethical”, in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis (eds) Fischer, 
F. & Forester, J. Sage Publications 1987, p. 42
24 Esman, M. Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and Strategies. Kumarian Press, 
USA 1991
25 Bjur, W. & Zomorrodian, A. “Towards Indigenous Theories of Administration: An International 
Perspective”, International Review of Administrative Sciences 52, No. 4 1986
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societal goals, and how people are engaged in such functions and relationships within 
the organisation.
These descriptions are influenced by cultural assumptions that formulate a society’s 
worldview. Esman promotes Western values of social justice, which are inseparable 
from the ideals of equality of opportunity. To give these abstractions some substance 
we need to ask: what does poverty look like? What does opportunity look like? Are 
such ideals universal concepts that can be defined with substantial universal 
agreement? External influences that are grounded in a context that situates Aboriginal 
people in their culture and recognises them as Aboriginal people, can not be validated 
by these systems. Aboriginal people do not share mainstream Australia’s 
philosophical context when they articulate responses to issues that confront them as a 
collective group.
If problem formulation is bound by the political context, does this formulation merely 
restrict the range of choice? This is a question that Aboriginal people need to, but 
rarely consider. That is, prescriptive options or incremental probability should not 
frame such considerations. To do so further induces Aboriginal people to be 
subservient to the reality of mainstream Australia and the values that shape this 
reality. To define a problem is to choose what goals or values to aim at, what values 
to sacrifice, what counts as a solution, and what kind of means to consider.26 The 
existing power relationship between Aboriginal people and government and the 
mechanisms used to sustain this relationship indicate that Aboriginal values, goals, 
rights and interests are largely excluded from this critical phase of problem definition.
26 Dery, D. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. University Press of Kansas, 1984, p. 116
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As argued by Dery, if the conception of the problem is wrong, the solution to the 
problem as conceived will not solve the problem as it exists.27 In a context framed by 
Australian political culture, policy formulation may simply provide new strategies for 
old ideas.
In raising key deficiencies in contemporary arguments used to explain consistent 
policy failure, this paper examines existing problem definition processes. A common 
aspect in these arguments is that the evaluation of failing policy performance in 
Aboriginal affairs is restricted to processes within political and administrative 
structures. This attention to process ignores the relationship between structures and 
processes. That is, processes exist and operate within structures designed and 
influenced by values. Whether they are political, administrative or legal, these 
institutions reflect, reinforce and produce outcomes that are consistent with the white 
Australian values on which they are based.
This lack of attention to the values that shape and drive political and administrative 
institutions diminishes not only the capacity to critically analyse the structures 
themselves, but also, the capacity to understand the construction of problems; the 
issues of causality. The repercussions of this blind spot in existing problem- 
identification and evaluation exercises, is that structural deficiencies are excluded 
from re-examination. That is, the intended outcomes of solutions currently offered to 
Aboriginal people are accepted as appropriate. But when these solutions fail to 
deliver the ‘expected change’ the problem is investigated at the level of 
implementation. At this level, the only elements that can be changed are process and
27 Dery, D. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis. University Press of Kansas, 1984, p.4
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strategies.
Ackoff argues solutions to problems become obsolete even if the problems to which 
they are addressed do not.28 Problem definition therefore needs to respond to the 
structural deficiencies that shape and define a ‘problem’, rather than the symptoms 
such deficiencies produce. This is a clear indication that the conceptions of problems 
need to be considered at a level much deeper than the administrative process of 
application where interventionist strategies can be initiated.
The emphasis for policy evaluation is therefore to shift the focus of evaluation activity 
away from what a policy is doing, towards why the policy was activated. This 
provides the opportunities for policy learning. May describes policy learning in two 
forms, as instrumental learning and social policy learning. 29 Instrumental learning 
focuses upon the implementation designs of policies and programs. Social policy 
learning considers the social construction of policy problems. It is the area of social 
policy learning that is of interest here. If we are to seriously evaluate the issue of 
causality, then the processes used to identify the construction of social problems must 
also be exposed to re-examination.
Fischer argues that changing such approaches moves the process of evaluation from 
situational validation to systems - level vindication as a move from a first-to second-
order evaluation.30 In essence, the essential task is a reappraisal of the normative.
This approach is consistent with the arguments Amy presents for the inclusion of
28 cited in William M. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis. Prentice Hall, 1994 p. 141
29 May, P. “Policy Learning and Failure” , Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 12 No.4 1992
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ethics in policy analysis. In particular, the methodology associated with problem 
definition. Amy describes ethical analysis as involving the examination of clashing 
normative perspectives’.31
Yet despite the efforts of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal challenges to the Australian 
normative in political discourses, public administrators have been reluctant to pursue 
or encapsulate such a debate. Impeding such discussion is the persistence of 
mainstream political and administrative institutions to consider Aboriginal people in 
an ‘all australian’ context.
How then, have these values and dimensions been upheld and applied to Australia’s 
public administration in Aboriginal affairs? It is evident that under utilitarian 
practices, Aboriginal people in Australia are excluded from defining the values that 
the political system and its instruments are charged to effect, while at the same time 
Aboriginal people are ‘considered’ to be included in the acceptance of these values. 
Consequently, Aboriginal people have been encouraged to adapt to programs and 
administrative structures designed by non-Aboriginal perspectives. It is an approach 
that has yielded few successes.
Adapting reform to indigenous needs had merely resulted in the adjustments of 
techniques at the periphery. Western approaches should be more concerned 
with ideology and thorough going societal changes not just management.32
A recent challenge was clearly articulated by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody. However, public policy in Aboriginal affairs has been unable to
30 Fischer, F. Evaluating Public Policy. Nelson-Hall Publishers. Chicago 1995 p. 59
31 Amy, D. J. “Can Policy Analysis be Ethical”, in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis, (eds) Frank 
Fischer & John Forester, Sage Publications. 1987 p. 54
32 Caiden, G. Administrative Reform Comes of Age. Walter de Gruyter Berlin 1991 p. 58
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meet this challenge on the normative. In fact, the Report itself contributes to this 
inactivity with a qualifying comment that suggests the problems confronting 
Aboriginal people are not particular to Aboriginal people.33 Despite the earlier 
description by Wooten on past government practices intent on conforming Aboriginal 
people and the history associated with this intent, there is a clear intention to umbrella 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal issues collectively. Consequently, causality becomes 
irrelevant as an indicator for possible solutions. This situation reflects how policy 
evaluation can be limited if confined to “expected changes” as argued by Nachmias.
It confines the understanding of issues to process, as identified by Caiden, and leads 
to generalised comments grasping for answers.
The issues in understanding the social construction of problems, illustrates the efforts 
yet to be achieved in public policy evaluation in relation to Aboriginal issues in 
Australia. Current policy evaluation practices still confined themselves to 
benchmarks set by the stated policy goals and objectives. As a result, governments 
continue to promote policies that reflect mainstream values in the context of which 
they are understood. That is, despite their values and intentions, they are bound by 
the cultural assumptions of their intellectual context.34
What is a problem?
Foremost to understanding the social construction of problems, are the processes used 
to determine what is a problem. A problem can be defined as a difference of 
perspective. Perspectives are shaped by the values we hold. That is, values give us
33 Wooten, J. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: Regional Report on Inquiry in 
New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, Australian Government Publishing Service. Canberra 1991
p. 26
34 Stokes, G. & Yardi, R. The Political Thought of C.D. Rowley (unpublished paper) 1998 p. 2
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our worldview. But values also provide solutions to ‘problems’ so that the balance of 
the worldview can be restored. Solutions therefore require processes that legitimise 
the values used to determine the ‘problem’. Aboriginal people are encouraged to 
enter into this discourse, and we do on issues such as native title, substance abuse, 
employment, cultural heritage and law and order. However, the values that this 
discourse upholds are not Aboriginal, they belong to mainstream. Thus, the solutions 
will not be, and cannot be Aboriginal solutions. Basically, what is being maintained 
is a








Consequently, existing practices seek the involvement of Aboriginal people into 
structures and process that are directed by mainstream values. Although this may 
reflect notions of procedural fairness within administrative practice, it does not equate 
with a recognition of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people. Such practices are 
familiar with the process of institutional assimilation and further consolidate the myth 
of terra nullius in administrative practice.
Operating in a political context framed by white Australian values, public 
administration has become a tool of disempowerment and assimilation. The problem-
35 Rose, D. B. “Histories and Rituals: Land Claims in the Territory”, in Indigenous Legal Issues. 
Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft. LBC Information Services, Second Edition. Sydney 
1997 p.187
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definition processes used by political and administrative institutions perpetuate 
Aboriginal engagement on the periphery of issues through these participatory 
management arrangements. This is a clear reflection of how problem structuring is 
embedded in a political process where ‘the definition of alternatives is the supreme 
instrument of power’ .36 The formulation of a problem is heavily influenced by the 
assumptions that different policy stakeholders-legislators, agency administrators, 
business leaders, consumer groups bring to a given problem situation. In turn, 
different formulations of the problem shape the ways that policy issues are defined.37 
But it is the way in which these formulations themselves are defined that requires 
closer scrutiny from policy makers in Aboriginal affairs.
Existing methods of problem definition consider Aboriginal people and the issues 
impacting upon them from the perspective of an ‘all australian’ context. Because this 
politics of non-recognition places Aboriginal people within mainstream structures, the 
historical process of disempowerment, referred to by the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, is perpetuated. Assimilationist practices are also free 
to dominate, operating as they do, within a discourse of authenticity. This discourse 
has promoted the establishment of participatory models enabling institutional 
assimilationist practices to occur and internal assimilation to emerge. For such 
mechanisms to work effectively, the friction between causality and commonality of 
social problems needs to be minimised. This has been achieved by locating issues 
confronting Aboriginal people in a contemporary context to the extent that history 
becomes irrelevant. In the business of providing solutions maybe there should be 
more critical analysis in determining the problem. As argued by Dery, apparently it
36 Schattschneider, E. E. The Semi sovereign People Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York. 1960 p.68
37 William M. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis. Prentice Hall, 1994 p. 143
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takes more than ideas in order to change policy.38
38 Dery, D. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis, University Press of Kansas, 1984, p. 119
C hapter 3 : Reconstructing the aboriginal Australian
From the beginning of white invasion, the very category ‘Aborigine’ assisted in the 
process of colonisation. By categorising Aboriginal people as a ‘primordial or 
primitive other’, whites also asserted the superiority of their own collective European 
identity. Such conceptions provided part of the rationale for the dispossession and 
removal of Aboriginal people from their lands, a violent attempt of elimination, and 
the denial of their political rights.40 Although much has been written by Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal authors, about Aboriginal attempts to alter these conceptions, it 
remains questionable if these descriptions have offered ‘real’, as opposed to 
‘imagined’ insights, in articulating the relationships between Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal Australia. What has been described and perceived as ‘real’ by these 
authors, may in fact be a product about Aboriginal people, which was originally 
constructed from the imagination of white Australians. Jack Davis wrote;
For the average Aboriginal today whether he is tribalised or not, life is one 
continuous struggle. Although he pays his taxes, if he is a town or city dweller 
the electric light and rental bills, he is at a distinct disadvantage because of his 
inheritance of his Aboriginality from the White Man’s Past.41
This inheritance has underpinned Aboriginal political movements from the 1930s to 
the 1990s. In the 1930s such movements pursued their efforts on ‘similarities’ with 
non-Aboriginal Australians. The primary issues for these writers were the widespread 
denial of justice and equality, and the limited conceptions of Aboriginal identity upon
39 Stokes, G. “Citizenship and Aboriginality: Two Conceptions of identity in Aboriginal Political 
Thought” in The Politics of Identity in Australia, (ed) Geoffrey Stokes, Cambridge University Press 
1997 p. 158
40 ib id
41 Stokes, G. “Citizenship and Aboriginality: Two Conceptions of identity in Aboriginal Political 
Thought” in The Politics of Identity in Australia, (ed) Geoffrey Stokes, Cambridge University Press 
1997 p. 165
29
which state governments based their policies.42 It was a political movement looking 
for rights, that is citizenship, that could be bestowed. However, after the 1967 
referendum, Aboriginal political movements situated themselves in the discourse of 
‘difference’. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the Aboriginal flag and more recently, 
native title, are examples of this expression.
But is this difference theirs or ours? Are we still relying upon the Aboriginality we 
‘inherited’ from the white man’s past to identify ourselves? The current 
representation of Aboriginality, while speaking the rhetoric o f ‘difference’, situates 
Aboriginal people in the position of ‘other’. It is continually delivered from a position 
of subordination to that of white Australia. That is, the ‘Aboriginal position’ is 
presented in a way that has been influenced by the capacity and commitment of 
government to recognise and respond to our assertions as Aboriginal people. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, if the political reality has such an influence in 
shaping Aboriginal positions then it seems highly unlikely that what is being proposed 
is not, in a pure form, an Aboriginal position. Therefore, such pragmatic approaches 
operating under the guise of assertions o f ‘Aboriginality’ are in actual fact, 
representations coming from within the discourse of the ‘other’. They represent a 
movement not so much about the advancement of Aboriginality that has ownership, 
authorship and authority within Aboriginal people themselves, but a movement that 
could be described as false radicalism.
What is important here is the way in which we understand and promote our
42 Stokes, G. “Citizenship and Aboriginality: Two Conceptions of identity in Aboriginal Political 
Thought” in The Politics of Identity in Australia, (ed) Geoffrey Stokes, Cambridge University Press 
1997 p. 160
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‘difference’. In particular, looking at ourselves from the point of view of our own 
definition and authority. That is: as subjects. The discourse o f ‘difference’ is 
explicitly tied to the status of Aboriginal people as described by Michael Dodson,
. ..the fundamental rationale for current policies of social justice should not rest 
on the past absence of rights or on plain citizenship entitlements. It should rest 
on the special identity and entitlements of indigenous Australians by virtue of 
our status as indigenous peoples.43
Unfortunately, our representations o f ‘Aboriginal ity’ undermine the very status upon 
which we articulate our difference because we place ourselves within their paradigms 
o f ‘object’ and ‘other’. For example, on principles of empowerment we continually 
seek to have control and ownership of decision-making processes based on our status 
as Aboriginal people. However, when we apply these principles we avail ourselves to 
being involved in mainstream decision-making structures. When we do become 
involved, we share our decision-making capacities; we have no control or ownership 
over them. We continue to accept such outcomes largely because we have yet to fully 
articulate ourselves outside o f ‘their’ paradigms. Subsequently, all we really achieve 
is to provide credibility to processes whose structural characteristics are influenced by 
the discourse of the ‘other’.
Within these paradigms, Aboriginal participation is always promoted in the positive in 
the belief that it is better to be involved in the process to ensure some input. The 
limited influence of this input, not only leads to a contamination of the Aboriginal 
perspective, but it also serves to legitimise white Australian definitions 
and processes of Aboriginality. If we continue to present a description of ourselves
43 Dodson, P. “Public Administration of Aboriginal Affairs has not been Humane Enough” Canberra 
Bulletin of Public Administration. No. 73 September 1993 p. 9
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that has been constructed in the discourse of the ‘other’, we only serve to legitimate 
that discourse and our position within it.
As a people we need to develop approaches that enable us to value the gains of 
Aboriginal participation in administrative arrangements. This requires a shift in 
evaluation practices where the benchmarks are set not by white Australia, but by us. 
Unfortunately, the articulation of our own Aboriginality outside of such descriptions 
represents the developments we have yet to make. To do this successfully requires of 
us an understanding of how modern practices of containment are articulated and 
maintained by government. As Hart argues,
...new technological advances and the materialism it generated should not be 
confused with a sea change in ideologies that suggest the colonised do not 
endure the same oppressive regime as in the beginning, the middle or in the 
present historical context. Postcolonialism merely represents another 
calibration of politics that nomadically hunts and gathers inside the discursive 
landscape established by colonialism and the dispossession of the invaded...44
Aboriginal people continually find themselves enmeshed in the terms of a debate with 
regard to rights that exist above those entitlements found within citizenship, yet 
governments respond with legislative frameworks of containment, operating through 
processes that reduce the right to a right that is bestowed to Aboriginal people. Such 
outcomes represent the difficulty we have in articulating a difference, which is ours. 
Many, if not all of our current representations by Aboriginal political movements, 
organisations and individuals, bring with them a heavy emphasis that describes an 
Aboriginal position that situates itself as the ‘other’. This is a reactive measure to 
existing practices that operates from within mainstream paradigms that allow us to be
44 Hañ, V. unpublished paper 1998 p. 9
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accommodated, contained, suppressed and acted upon as ‘objects’.
There has been much description of Aboriginal approaches to balance this 
relationship, however, until recent times, little attention has been focused upon how 
the perceptions of mainstream Australia are maintained and considered inappropriate. 
In creating these perceptions utilitarianism, equality and egalitarianism, have been 
key positions taken by white Australia to deter Aboriginal movements of resistance to 
assimilation and facilitate mainstream practices of containment.
The shortcomings evident in the administration of Aboriginal affairs have an 
historical basis. The influence of Benthamism as the guiding tenor of the penal and 
colonial enterprise in Australia is clearly evident. Collins gives a closer examination 
of Bentham's philosophy supporting the assertions of other writers to the prominence 
of Benthamism in shaping Australia's political thought.45 Utilitarianism, legalism and 
positivism are all significant aspects of this philosophy. Hancock, provides the classic 
description of Australian political culture:
Australian democracy has come to look upon the state as a vast public utility, 
whose duty it is to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number.46
This utilitarian character is a major influence of Australia's modem political system. 
However, the quantitative nature of this political culture negates opportunities for 
Aboriginal people as a minority group to define their roles and themselves. This 
politics of exclusion indicates how the operational assumptions influencing
45 Collins, H. “Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society”, in 
Australia: The Daedalus Symposium (ed) Stephen Graubär, Australia. 1985
46 cited in Rowse, T. “Political Culture: A Concept and Its ideologies” in Critical Essays in Australian 
Politics. Graeme Duncan Edward Arnold Pty Ltd Melbourne 1978 p. 6
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administrative practices are, in themselves, reductionist. Unfortunately, there is little 
recognition of the major contribution these assumptions have had in the failure of 
administrative practices to respond positively towards Aboriginal interests, definitions 
and values.
The utilitarian psychology in Australia legitimizes the pursuit of interest, while 
the dominance of the ideology negates the possibility of a genuine battle of 
ideas.47
This platform of utilitarianism has become unquestioned and embedded within 
Australian political thought from which notions of equality and egalitarianism arise.
As fondamental premises they reveal themselves in many forms, but their most blatant 
displays occur during debates on Aboriginal land rights under the banner of'all 
australians'. Under this banner, Aboriginal people are mutually included as members 
of the wider Australian community, while at the same time socially and politically 
excluded as Aboriginal people. It is a clear reflection of the power relationship that 
exists between Aboriginal people and government. More precisely, it illustrates the 
capacity of the dominant group to define the existence of the 'Other' and subject the 
'Other' to these descriptions.
Power is exercised epistemologically in the dual practices of naming and 
evaluating...These practices of naming and knowledge construction deny all 
autonomy to those so named and imagined, extending power, control, 
authority and domination over them...48
Goldberg’s description enables Aboriginal people to place in context the comments by 
Jack Davis concerning whose Aboriginality we, as a collective group, have been
47 Collins, H. “Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society” in 
Australia: The Daedalus Symposium, (ed) Stephen Graubar, Angus & Robertson. Australia 1985 p. 155
48 Goldberg, D. Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, Blackwell, Cambridge USA 
1993 p. 150
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articulating. In reference to the production of knowledge, Goldberg acknowledges the 
role of philosophical thinking in establishing racialised discourse and the role of 
philosophical thinking in both critique and articulation of one’s own discourse. In 
Australia, utilitarianism, liberalism and equality are paradigms defined and advanced 
by white Australia as the norms within which racialised discourse has been conducted.
Goldberg argues that the articulation of race within these paradigms has been 
normalised through modernity. Goldberg refers to modernity as a general period 
emerging from the sixteenth century in the historical formation that has come to be 
called ‘the West’.49 The modem project has emerged in terms of a broad sweep of 
social and intellectual conditions such as the commodification and capital 
accumulation of market based societies and the political conception of rational self- 
interested subjects. Modernity manifests itself in the fixing of the social in terms of 
bureaucracy, of the political in terms of the law, and of the economic in terms of the 
laws of the market.50 Basic to modernity’s conception is the nation state as Subject 
whose social subjects are individuals divorced from the particularities of identity and 
culture. It is the rights of these social subjects that dictate the concerns of 
liberalism.51 Individualism and equality are key foundations of its universal 
principles.
Yet, neither the paradigms, rights nor self-definition has been authored by Aboriginal 
people as subjects. Utilitarianism would seem to dictate that the rights of the ‘other’ 
are consistent with the rights o f ‘all australians’. The discourse of difference asserted





by the ‘other’ therefore must take the form of asserting Aboriginal rights based on 
difference that exceeds base egalitarian levels. What is needed for the ‘other’, is a 
fundamental change in discourse in which Aboriginal people constitute themselves as 
subjects rather than as objects or things that can be placed in relation to white 
Australia. A subject defines itself by its own authority. A group as subject defines 
who ‘they’ are and this dialectically sets up the ‘other/s’ in relation to the subject.
This act of self-definition and assertion creates the subject. The subject may aggress 
against the ‘other’, may liaise with the ‘other’, tolerate the ‘other’, and acknowledge 
the ‘other’ in its own terms, eg. equality, discrimination, or special consideration. At 
no time however, does the subject have to accept the ‘other/s’ paradigms and self- 
definition. The task remains for the ‘other’ to refuse to position itself in the subject’s 
dialectical and discourse of difference and to reposition itself outside this discourse 
and to define itself as subject.
Issues surrounding the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
illustrate Aboriginal compliance to accept descriptions of Aboriginality and a 
reluctance to position themselves outside of such descriptions. The Royal 
Commission identified that the issues confronting Aboriginal Australians were inter­
related. Despite identifying these lateral relationships, issues such as unemployment, 
health, substance abuse and education are continually espoused as the underlying 
issues representing Aboriginal disadvantage. In responding to these social problems, 
governments have co-ordinated their responses through vertical structures, reflecting 
what they consider to be a ‘whole of government approach’ to address ‘underlying 
issues’. This sort of response is indicative of Goldberg’s representation of power.
The underlying issues of non-recognition, disempowerment and assimilation operate
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laterally not vertically, nor does responding to the symptoms these influences have 
shaped respond to the structural deficiencies already identified. Yet Aboriginal people 
have taken on the government’s identification of not only what the problems are, but 
also how best to address them.
Under terra nullius social policy, government initiatives in the administration of 
Aboriginal affairs have merely undergone mechanical adjustments, designed to retain 
rather than challenge or advance the recognition of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal 
people. Aboriginal people are not recognised by white australia and its institutions as 
Aboriginal people; we are not recognised as an Aboriginal race with our own cultural 
values. Although previous government policies and programs have been based upon a 
partial recognition of'difference', it is not considered a 'difference ' of exclusion. As 
Duffy argues,
It seems the only right Indigenous peoples in Australia have is the right to do 
what they want as long as it satisfies the non-Indigenous ways of doing 
things.52
For all intent and purposes, governments have created conceptions of morality and in 
so doing decided who is capable of moral action and who is subjected to it, who is 
capable of moral autonomy and who should be directed.53
The rights of Aboriginal people to self-determination was a major underlying theme 
of Australian public policy in Aboriginal affairs prior to the election of the Howard
52 Duffy. M. “Back to assimilation? What’s new!” Land Rights Queensland June-July 1996 p. 19
53 Goldberg, D. Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning. Blackwell, Cambridge USA 
1993 p. 148
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Government. Article three of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples states,
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.54
From an Aboriginal perspective the principle of self- determination is fundamentally 
based upon rights. However, the rights of Aboriginal people can not be recognised in 
government mechanisms that limit Aboriginal activity to a participatory and advisory 
role. Aboriginal interpretations of Australia's rhetoric for self-determination, would 
argue that governments have failed to translate successfully these rights into domestic 
policy. Jull comments that the view of indigenous peoples as more than objects of 
White 'good' works or control appears to be a true threshold.55 This threshold will 
continue to exist while Australia's political and knowledge production institutions 
refuse to recognise the validity of Aboriginal knowledge and identity.
Admitting the other's subjectivity is at once to give up epistemological and 
political control; it is to admit scientific and administrative inefficiency.56
The Howard Coalition Government has moved away from self-determination as a 
platform for Aboriginal policy, and is currently pursuing strategies of economic 
independence and self-empowerment under a policy of full equality of opportunity.57 
For Aboriginal people this is not uncharted territory. Paul Hasluck Minister for 
Territories in the Menzies’ Governments from 1951 until 1966, promoted full equality
54 An Interpretation and Explanation of: The Draft Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A 
Report for the Australian National Internship Program and the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, June 1995
55 Juli, P. Australian Nationhood and Outback Indigenous Peoples. North Australian Research Unit, 
Australian National University. Darwin 1991 p. 21
56 Goldberg, D. Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, Blackwell, Cambridge USA 
1993 p. 152
57 Stramandinoli, G. “Herron’s Plan: self-empowerment” in ATSIC News Summer 1997 p.7
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of opportunity under assimilationist policies in the 1960s. In 1926, a report from the 
New South Wales Aboriginal Welfare Board made its intentions clear as to the 
placement of Aboriginal children with white families by stating;
...the superior standard of life would pave the way for the absorption of these 
people into the general population.58
We, as a people and participants, have experienced the application of the current 
Federal Government policies towards Aboriginal people. The question we need to be 
asking is how does the context of current policies differ from those of the past?
Goldberg’s critique provides an alternative analysis towards understanding not only 
how the Australian experience has evolved, but also how it is maintained. It describes 
and identifies the processes of non-recognition or ‘irrelevant categories’ of past liberal 
moral theorists from which Australian egalitarianism has emerged. More importantly, 
in association with our own experiences, it provides another tool to critique whether 
or not the ‘difference’ Aboriginal people have been articulating is indeed an 
‘ Aboriginally’ inherited from the white man’s past.
If Australia is to be progressive in establishing new institutions that focus upon 
actively supporting the principles of self-determination as understood by Aboriginal 
people, there must be clear definition and understanding of the terms of reference. 
Without this commitment, governments will continue to tinker at the periphery with 
technical-administrative measures that only serve to promote Aboriginal dependency 
to bureaucratic mechanisms, rather than create effective new institutions operating 
from the basis of Aboriginal autonomy. As a consequence of systemic influences
58 Read, P. “The Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in N.S.W. 1883-1969”, 
Occasional paper No. 1 1982 p. 2
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identified in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, the 
instruments for recognition and self-definition cannot be singular or local in their 
response.
Fundamental to creating that change is the recognition of Aboriginal people as a 
people, as a race, as a culture. The description illustrated by Mathews in chapter One 
demonstrates the inability of the existing system to relate to ideas or a currency other 
than its own. In the political discussion between government and Aboriginal people, 
the exchange between black and white is grounded in an all white currency -  that of 
assimilation - because this is the only currency they understand. As the dominant 
cultural group, they are empowered to state what the medium of exchange will be; 
what ‘currency’ the process is going to use. When Aboriginal people enter these 
processes, they encounter the reality that only one currency can be dealt in, and it is 
not Aboriginal. This alienates Aboriginal people from [our] own valuables, [our] own 
non-negotiables and seduces Aboriginal people to give these up in exchange for the 
opportunity to spend the white currency.59 Under current administrative practices, 
Aboriginal people make themselves available to processes that can only imagine the 
Aboriginal reality. I say imagined, because no recognition of Aboriginal people can 
exist outside the white frames of reference that direct mainstream legal, political and 
social institutions seeking Aboriginal involvement.
59 Lynda Brownsey August 1999, private correspondence in possession of the author.
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C h a p t e r  4: A b o r ig in a l  D e a t h s  In C u s t o d y
The Australian Government has made a substantial investment to address the over­
representation of Aboriginal people within the criminal justice system. Following 
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and consideration by 
Commonwealth and State Governments towards implementing the 339 
recommendations, little evidence seems to have been made in reducing Aboriginal 
incarceration rates and Aboriginal deaths in custody. The Commission’s report 
identified that the causes for Aboriginal over-representation were systemic. It also 
identified two levels at which to address these systemic influences; a local response 
through the criminal justice system or alternatively, to tackle the fundamental issues - 
the relationship between indigenous people and government - created by an historical 
process of Aboriginal disempowerment.
Despite an injection of funds in excess of $500 million, Aboriginal incarceration rates 
have risen nationally. The attention of Commonwealth and State Government 
programs designed to divert Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from the criminal 
justice system, have in fact seen incarceration rates rise. Statistics kept by the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, show that the numbers of indigenous prisoners 
has risen from 2166 in 1991 to 3750 in 1998.60 Given that the fundamental objective 
of the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
was to reduce incarceration rates, the assessment of current practices could only be 
reviewed as failing.
60 Australian Institute of Criminology, http://www.aie, gov.au/research/corrections/stats/ti 137- 
ext/index.html
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Popular explanations for these failings confine themselves to questions about the 
commitment of government to not just implement the recommendations, but to 
implement them effectively. But are the recommendations themselves an appropriate 
response to the issues they were designed to redress?
The argument presented here is that the recommendations suggested by the 
Commission predominantly pursue a local response. That is, a response within the 
criminal justice system. In this context, the recommendations can only service a 
need to sensitise points within the criminal justice system which were seen to impact 
negatively on Aboriginal people. The starting position is therefore located within the 
criminal justice system, which realigns the way we differentiate between causes and 
symptoms. Within public administration this is more commonly referred to as goal 
displacement. The fundamental objective of the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations was to reduce incarceration rates; yet, government responses have 
directed their efforts towards stopping deaths in custody. The confusion is such that 
the establishment of new administrative mechanisms designed to incorporate 
Aboriginal participation are themselves contained within false parameters. In 
essence, the practical reality and application of this localised response is to apply 
band-aid treatment to internal administrative procedures in ignorance of the systemic 
nature of the cause. As a response, the approach limits the capacity of governments 
to address the fundamental issues as identified by the Commission’s report.
Background
The high incidence of Aboriginal deaths in police custody became an international
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embarrassment for the Australian government during the 1980s. To find out why 
these deaths were occurring, the federal government established a Royal Commission 
in October 1987. Commissioner Johnston explained that the task given to the 
Commission was to inquire into the deaths found to fall within jurisdiction and to 
enquire into any subsequent action taken in respect of each of those deaths including 
the conduct of coronial, police and other inquires and any other things that were not 
done but ought to have been done.61 This Letters Patent was later amended after 
Commissioner Muirhead successfully argued that the task should not be limited to 
understanding how the deaths occurred, but to know why they died, that is, that, for
ffythe purpose of reporting on any underlying issues, associated with those deaths.
The Royal Commission proceeded to investigate the deaths of ninety-nine Aboriginal 
people that occurred in the custody of police or juvenile detention institutions 
between 1st January 1980 and 31st May 1989. At a substantial cost, the findings of 
this Commission were released in May 1991.
Central to the outcome of this investigation, was the identification and explanation of 
underlying issues. As stated earlier, these influences are represented by 
assimilationist practices, disempowerment and the non-recognition of Aboriginal 
people as Aboriginal people. This aspect is critical because it sets the framework 
underpinning the intentions of the recommendations. An integral component of this 
framework was the recognition that historical and systemic influences have shaped 
and determined contemporary issues that bring Aboriginal people into contact with 
the criminal justice system. These influences were sustained in mainstream political,
61 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody-National Report-Overview and 
Recommendations. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1991 p. 2
62 ibid
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legal and social institutions. From this background, the Report’s conclusions can be 
summarised into three key findings. That
a) the causes for Aboriginal over-representation in the criminal justice system are 
both systemic and historical
b) the empowerment of Aboriginal people is a basic requirement towards eliminating 
Aboriginal ‘disadvantage’ and non-Aboriginal domination
c) changes to the criminal justice system alone will not have a significant impact on 
reducing incarceration rates
The Recommendations
Since the Royal Commission handed down its findings and recommendations, there 
has been much bureaucratic activity but nothing in the way of positive results 
regarding lower incarceration rates. Current attempts to explain away these failings 
have commonly focused upon the lack of commitment by governments to implement 
the recommendations, or identifying short-comings in the administrative processes by 
which recommendations themselves are implemented. The general findings of 
Cunneen and McDonald acknowledges the failure of governments to adequately 
implement recommendations, thus, contributing to unnecessary incarceration.63 The 
findings of Dodson’s Report identified the failure of State governments to implement 
recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.64
At this level, examination of government responses is isolated to a problem of 
implementation. From this position it can be argued that incarceration rates are 
increasing because recommendations are not being implemented, or not being
63 Cunneen, C. & McDonald, D. Keeping Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People Out of Custody. 
Office o f Public Affairs, ATSIC, Canberra. 1997.
64 Indigenous Deaths in Custody 1989 -  1996. Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner. October 1996
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implemented effectively. However, can this argument be sustained?
Dodson’s Report identifies 118 recommendations from the Royal Commission’s final 
Report breached by State and Territory governments. Of these 84 or 71% can only be 
effective with a pre-condition of incarceration. That is, to be implemented the 
recommendation requires the physical presence of an inmate. A further breakdown 
reveals that 26 or 22% require a death in custody before the recommendation can be 
effectively implemented. Of the remaining 34 recommendations, 24 or 70% become 
effective within the criminal justice system. These recommendations largely suggest 
alternative methods of operations within the criminal justice system. In total, the 
combination of recommendations that require a pre-condition of incarceration and 
those that operate within the criminal justice system represent 108 (91%) of the 118 
recommendations identified by Dodson’s Report.
In Chapter 26 Vol. 4 of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, it 
is emphasised that,
. . .  changes to the operation o f the criminal justice system alone will not have a 
significant impact on the number o f Aboriginal persons entering into custody 
or the number o f those who die in custody. . 65
Despite this emphasis, the recommendations examined in Dodson’s report reveals a 
heavy concentration within the criminal justice system. Only a vivid imagination 
could conclude and argue that ‘lack of commitment’ to implement the 
recommendations can be blamed for increasing rates of incarceration when 
incarceration is a predominate feature for their effective implementation.
65 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1991. Vol. 4 Ch.26 p. 1
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Underlying these explanations is a belief that the recommendations are appropriate. 
In light of the evidence we need to reconsider our perceptions of why so little has 
been achieved. Is the problem one of implementation? Or, Is the problem directly 
related to what is being implemented?
To measure the capacity of the recommendations to respond to the key findings raised 
earlier, it needs to be identified where the recommendations themselves become 
activated. To maintain consistency with these key findings, recommendations are 
grouped into sections that identify,
a) recommendations activated within the criminal justice system
b) recommendations activated by government outside the criminal justice system
c) recommendations involving Aboriginal participation with government outside the 
criminal justice system
d) recommendations activated by Aboriginal people outside the criminal justice 
system.
The placement of recommendations within these categories identifies that of the 339 
recommendations,
a) 192 or 56.5% are activated within the criminal justice system
b) 76 or 22.5% are activated by government outside the criminal justice system
c) 69 or 20.5% involve Aboriginal participation with government outside the 
criminal justice system
d) 2 or .5% activated by Aboriginal people outside the criminal justice system.
In this analysis 56.5% of the recommendations are activated within the criminal 
justice system. It then falls upon the remaining 43.5% to empower Aboriginal people 
and address the systemic and historical influences which bring Aboriginal people into 
contact with the criminal justice system.
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This analysis reveals that 22.5% of the total recommendations activated outside of the 
criminal justice system remain the prerogative of Commonwealth or State/Territory 
Governments. These recommendations do not require the input of Aboriginal people 
to initiate the implementation process. If the recommendations maintain that 
implementation is the sole prerogative of governments, it is difficult to imagine that 
somehow Aboriginal people are breaking down assimilationist practices, or 
empowering themselves within these processes. More importantly, where is the 
recognition of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people if the power to initiate does not 
reside with them?
20.5% of recommendations activated outside of the criminal justice system seek 
Aboriginal involvement within mainstream decision-making structures. Participation 
in decision-making bodies is often seen as an empowering process, however, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, participation in mainstream institutions, under 
existing arrangements, excludes the representation of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal 
people. Nor do these arrangements reflect the context in which empowerment was 
described by Johnston who stated,
The thrust of this report is that the elimination of disadvantage requires an end 
of domination and an empowerment of Aboriginal people; that control of their 
lives of their communities must be returned to Aboriginal hands.66
In relation to empowerment, it is noticeable that what was considered to be the thrust 
of the report has produced 2 out of 339 recommendations that are activated by 
Aboriginal people themselves, that is, independent of government and separate from 
the criminal justice system.
66 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody-National Report-Overview and 
Recommendations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1991 p. 15
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The context for application
This analysis clearly highlights inconsistencies between the key findings of the Royal 
Commission and the recommendations. Somewhere between penning the ‘thrust of 
the report’ and the drafting of recommendations, insights went missing. But it is not 
just where the recommendations direct the work of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people that betrays the Commission’s intention. It is also reflected in the organising of 
participatory arrangements between Aboriginal people and government. That is, how 
Aboriginal interests are framed for interaction with Government. The establishment of 
the Queensland Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committee will be used as a model to 
illustrate the issues asserted in this and previous chapters.
Recommendation 2 of the Royal Commission states;
That subject to the adoption by governments of this recommendation and the 
concurrence of Aboriginal communities and appropriate organisations, there be 
established in each State and Territory an independent Aboriginal Justice 
Advisory Committee to provide each government with advice on Aboriginal 
perceptions of criminal justice matters, and on the implementation of the 
recommendations of this report.
The Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committee in each State should be drawn 
from, and represent, a network of similar local or regionally based 
communities which can provide the State Advisory Committee with 
information of the views of Aboriginal people. It is most important that the 
views of people living outside the urban centres be incorporated.67
The Queensland Minister for Justice and Attorney General officially appointed the 
Queensland Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committee on May 31 1993. The five 
members of the committee are appointed for two-year terms, and operate under the
67 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody-National Report-Overview and 
Recommendations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1991 p. 32
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following terms of reference:
• provide government with informed advice on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
views on criminal justice matters and on the implementation of the Royal 
Commission recommendations concerning the criminal justice system;
• propose changes to policies which affect the operation of the criminal justice 
system;
• develop programs for crime prevention and social control which enhance 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-management and autonomy;
• develop and encourage programs which increase the recruitment of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people to the staff of criminal justice agencies; and
• arrange for the dissemination on policies and programs between different agencies 
and between parallel bodies in different states
It could be argued that the Queensland AJAC successfully met the requirements of the 
above terms of reference. The committee consulted with Aboriginal communities 
throughout the state so that they could be informed of criminal justice matters as they 
impact at the regional or local level.
The Committee also undertook a number of major projects including;
• Justices of the Peace Training Program
• Coroner's Act 1958 Review and Post-Death Investigations Submission
• Cross-Cultural Training for the Judiciary
• Customary Law Discussion paper
• investigated the administration of Juvenile Justice
• Criminal Justice and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Women 69
While these developments symbolise a greater awareness and response to the needs of 
Aboriginal people as they interface with the criminal justice system, they do not 
support the key findings or the thrust of the Royal Commission’s Report.
68 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committee, 1995 p. 6
69 ibid
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The language within the terms of reference upon which the Queensland AJAC 
operated, implies that Aboriginal people take a passive position to the 
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations, while the government plays 
the pro-active role in determining how these recommendations will be implemented. 
Aboriginal people in this capacity provide, propose, develop and arrange. These are 
not words that promote empowerment as referred to by Johnston. The practical 
reality is government defines the policy goals, defines the context in which the goals 
are to be pursued and the roles and responsibilities of Aboriginal people in pursuing 
those goals in the prescribed context.
The issue of empowerment represents a critical component where clear 
inconsistencies can be established between recommendations and key findings of the 
Royal Commission. The arguments presented here have illustrated that the location of 
where recommendations are activated and the proposed framework of Aboriginal 
representation fails the Commission’s own test regarding the description of what 
empowerment should look like. But this is not the only inconsistency. As 
commented in chapter one, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
provided an historical and structural examination of Australia’s administration in 
Aboriginal affairs. The Commission found that these historical and systemic 
influences were significant factors in shaping contemporary Aboriginal circumstance. 
However, the recommendations do not respond to these structural deficiencies.
Rather, the emphasis as directed by the recommendations respond to the symptoms 
these deficiencies produce. That is, issues such as health, education, land, substance 
abuse, economic development and housing, provide the primary thrust of the
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recommendations instead of confronting the influences that shaped such 
circumstances.





This is of course another critical inconsistency between the recommendations and the 
key findings of the report. Rather than redress these structural deficiencies there is an 
attempt to further incorporate Aboriginal people into the very systems influential in 
creating the circumstances in the first instance. This is in contrast to the 
Commission’s own findings as commented in chapter one where values direct the 
structure and function of political, legal and social institutions. This of course leads to 
the question; can you reform assimilationist structures from within? The only answer 
to this is no. Clearly evident is the inability of the Commissioners to escape their own 
cultural assumptions. As discussed in chapter two, the discourse of authenticity that 
Aboriginal people are encouraged into is a true threshold. The fact that one of the 
Commissioners was Aboriginal does not nullify this conclusion, but reinforces the 
arguments suggested in chapter three of how we ourselves are prepared to offload our
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own valuables in order to participate within mainstream institutions. This is indicated 
by the activities Aboriginal people enter into in response to their own over­
representation.
Whereas the Report emphasised the need to empower Aboriginal people, current 
strategies and programs focus on ‘Aboriginal problem behaviour’. To deal with the 
issue o f ‘Aboriginal problem behaviour’, governments are pursing a policy of 
‘indigenisation’. Indigenisation is the recruitment of indigenous people to staff the 
components of the criminal justice system, which directly interface with indigenous 
people.70 It is a policy which focuses the attention on accommodating and adjusting 
Aboriginal people, ‘as the problem’, in the system. At the point of interface, all this 
policy does is change the colour scheme of service delivery. McRae comments;
...as many overseas and Australian researchers have recognised, analysis of 
this kind indulges in blaming the victim, an approach which, by focussing on 
the supposed inadequacies of the victim, deflects attention away from the 
inadequacies of the system where the problems really lie.71
Havemann cites William Ryan’s critique of the "Blaming the victim ideology which 
states the problem-definition that underpins it
...attributes defect and inadequacy to the malignant nature of poverty, 
injustice, slum life, and racial difficulties. The stigma that marks the victim 
and accounts for his victimization as an acquired stigma, a stigma of social, 
rather than genetic in origin. But the stigma, the defect, the fatal differences - 
though derived in the past from environmental forces - is still located within 
the victim...It is a brilliant ideology for justifying a perverse form of social 
action designed to change, not society, as one might expect, but rather 
society's victim.72
70 Havemann, P. Law and Order for Canada’s Indigenous People. Prairie Justice Research, Regina 1984 
p. 131
71 McRae, H. Aboriginal Legal Issues. The Law Book Company Ltd, 1991 p.245
72 Havemann, P. Law and Order for Canada’s Indigenous People, Prairie Justice Research, Regina 1984
p. 6
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Government proposals, as part of the implementation of the Deaths in Custody 
recommendations, are largely founded upon this ideology. For example, programs 
which offer Justice of the Peace training within Aboriginal communities, the 
establishment of Aboriginal Police Liaison Officers, court room interpreters, oral 
rather than written pre-sentencing reports and the Aboriginal Witness project, attribute 
the problem of Aboriginal over-representation to Aboriginal ‘problem-behaviour’. 
Subsequently, government programs largely focus on changing Aboriginal ‘problem 
behaviour’ on those before the courts. These are technical changes within an existing 
system. This approach aims at fine-tuning current programs by accommodating or 
adjusting Aboriginal people to their own over-representation in the system.
The Australian Law Reform Commission commented on the inadequacies of 
indigenisation as a solution;
The appointment of Aborigines as justices of the peace and magistrates is 
unlikely to go very far towards reducing the number of Aborigines coming 
into contact with the criminal justice system, nor does it go any way towards 
the recognition of Aboriginal customary laws. Taken alone it seems an 
insufficient response to the present situation...the history of indigenisation as a 
policy in other countries with ethnic minorities is not encouraging.73
The Royal Commission itself put forward the view that,
The problem with the indigenisation of government services including the 
criminal justice system, is that indigenous peoples continue to be subordinate 
and peripheral to policy-making and decision-making processes. Indigenous 
staff also often suffer from painful conflicts of interests-being accountable to 
their people in a personal sense, but usually powerless within the structures of 
their profession.74
A policy of indigenisation seeks answers to the wrong questions. The questions and
73 Australian Law Reform Commission, 1986. The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws Report 
No.31 Vol. 2 para 837
74 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1991. Vol. 3 Ch.22 p.82
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ongoing strategies Australian governments need to consider are not those that seek to 
assimilate Aboriginal people, but rather, those that seek to empower Aboriginal 
mechanisms of mediation. The Canadian experiences have revealed that under a 
policy of indigenisation, symptoms have become confused with causes in the 
explanations for Aboriginal over-involvement.75 Australia has been reluctant to learn 
from Canadian experiences to ensure that those same mistakes are not repeated.
The Royal Commission commented that, with loss of independence goes a loss of self 
esteem. Yet, efforts to revive this ‘self esteem’ do not reflect independence as being 
independent, but as a component within the wider jurisdiction of a higher authority.
As an incorporatist model the method is assimilationist and is again inconsistent with 
the Royal Commission’s own finding that,
.. .the assimilationist policy assumed that their culture and way of life is 
without value and that we confer a favour on them by assimilating them into 
our ways.. ,77
Such expressions are indicative of many that consider themselves sympathetic to 
Aboriginal issues but when articulating these sympathies, ‘the words don’t fit the 
mouth’.
The last five years have seen governments adopt a managerialist approach towards 
implementing the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody. This approach has failed to address the systemic causes of Aboriginal 
over-representation in the criminal justice system. Rather, the response by
75Havemann, P. Law and Order for Canada’s Indigenous People, Prairie Justice Research, Regina 1984
p. 128
6 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. 1991. Vol. 1 Ch. 1 p.9 
77 ibid
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governments has been to localise the nature of the ‘problem’, offering technical 
modifications to existing administrative practices. Instrumental to this managerialist 
approach was the development of a participatory model of consultation that imposes a 
context of false consensus upon participatory fora. These models are consistent with 
practices of institutional assimilation where Aboriginal people are merged into the 
applications and practices of mainstream administrative institutions. As mediators and 
clones of this new model they then impose the rhetorical assumptions and definitions 
upon Aboriginal people and communities. This is internal assimilation, where the 
definitions and characteristics of the ‘other’ are being imposed by Aboriginal people 
themselves. For example, the Justices of the Peace training program received support 
from members of the judiciary and Queensland's AJAC committee despite the fact that 
the program implies that Aboriginal people are at fault for their own over­
representation.
The fundamental objective of the Royal Commission's report was to set the policy and 
social goals for reducing the incarceration rates of Aboriginal people. Under a 
managerialist approach and as directed by these recommendations, governments have 
largely focused on stopping deaths in custody to achieve quantifiable output based 
objectives that would localise the response, preserve a symbolic image and contain and 
restructure political conflict. This is again inconsistent with the key findings of the 
Royal Commission which stated,
the over-representation of Aboriginal people in custody (and the deaths of 
some of them) are part of the ongoing conflict between ‘colonizer’ and 
‘colonized’.78
78 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 1991. Vol. 2 Ch. 10 p.4
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This view was also intimated by Mathews in chapter one. It would appear then that 
the basic flaw of the Commission's recommendations is their failure to promote and 
redress the fundamental issues of disempowerment, systemic and historical influences 
that they themselves identified as creating the circumstances that bring Aboriginal 
people into contact with the criminal justice system.
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C hapter 5: S elf-determination
In April 1999, an article by Rosemary Neill was critical of the lack of moral courage 
by both sides of Australian politics to debate the repetitive failure of government 
policies in Aboriginal affairs.79 In describing the current the state of play, Neill brings 
together common arguments of both the Left and Right used to explain away this 
deficiency. The opinions provided focussed upon the concept of self-determination. 
Not surprisingly, Neill puts forward the suggestion that such a debate should respond 
to the question of why self-determination is falling spectacularly short of its 
objectives, tens of billions of dollars and 27 years after its adoption by the Whitlam 
government.80
It is not possible within this paper to fully explore Neill’s question; however, it is 
possible to put forward some general comments such a debate might include. This 
chapter briefly comments on the interpretation of self-determination in international 
law in relation to nation states. Australian government policies and practices pursued 
under the rhetoric of self-determination are then examined against this international 
interpretation with an emphasis on administrative arrangements between Aboriginal 
people and government. Both international interpretations and Australia’s domestic 
application of self-determination are then examined against Aboriginal meanings of 
what self-determination requires. The outcome of this analysis indicates that self- 








The rights of people to self-determination is firmly located in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).81 Article 1 of both covenants state:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.82
However, this description of self-determination is insufficient in providing a succinct 
definition. The statement itself can only have real meaning in the evaluation of the 
contexts in which these fine words are portrayed. That is, to examine the rhetoric of 
self-determination against behaviour. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
established to supervise implementation of the ICCPR, has held the view that the right 
of self-determination has significance for the internal constitutional and political order 
of States.83 A former member of the Committee, Roslyn Higgins, has summarised 
this practice:
What then is this right of self-determination that the peoples of an independent 
country are entitled to? It is the right to determine their own political and 
economic and social destiny... [T]he idea of self-determination as the right to 
determine one’s own destiny, and not to have it imposed from above, goes 
right back to the beginning of the Committee’s work.84
A report of Colombia which commented on how all the peoples of its country had the 
opportunity to participate in the political and social structures, to change the
81 Indigenous Legal Issues. Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft. LBC Information 
Services, Second Edition. Sydney 1997 p. 474
82 Pritchard, S. Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights, Federation Press Australia 
1998 p.186




government through elections, to contribute to the formulation of policy, and to 
determine events was evidenced to illustrate an enactment of this description.85 In its 
comments on the report, the HRC expressed satisfaction that the approach of the State 
party to the right of peoples to self-determination ‘has been in line with the 
development of participatory democracy and that Colombia is making real efforts to 
achieve full equality for minority groups’.86
This understanding of self-determination poses some serious considerations for 
Aboriginal people. Firstly, self-determination is underpinned by notions of equality; 
secondly, its application operates within the existing instruments of nation states; and 
thirdly, self-determination is encapsulated in democratic principles and practices. 
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR contain strong non-discrimination provisions that 
account for the equality issues.87 As far as protecting the interests of nation states, 
Reynolds argues that the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Internal Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States ensures that the needs of states 
took precedence.88 Within this declaration it also contains,
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole possible belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country...
85 Pritchard, S. Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights. Federation Press Australia 
1998 p. 188
86 ib id
87 Indigenous Legal Issues. Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft. LBC Information 
Services, Second Edition. Sydney 1997 p. 474
88 Reynolds. H. Aboriginal Sovereignty. Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1996 p. 164
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The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable.89
James Anaya observed that self-determination should be understood,
.. .as a right of cultural groupings to the political, institutions necessary to 
allow them to exist and develop according to their distinctive characteristics. 
The institutions and degree of autonomy, necessarily, will vary as the 
circumstances of each case vary. And in determining the required conditions 
for a claimant group, decisionmakers must weigh in the human rights of 
others. While not precluded independent statehood will be justified only in 
rare instances. Such a formulation of self-determination, I believe, will 
advance global peace and stability consistent with international law’s 
normative trends.90
Anaya’s comments clearly allow for the possibility of independent statehood, 
however, the vagaries of how ‘cultural groupings’ access political institutions are 
sufficient to perpetuate existing practices of institutional assimilation. From these 
descriptions it is clear that self-determination was not designed for the great variety of 
peoples who found themselves within the borders of new states or for indigenous 
minorities in New World settler societies.91 On this basis, Aboriginal people need to 
consider the appropriateness of self-determination as a political vehicle, if it can only 
be pursued in a context that protects the rights and interests of nation states. As Boldt 
argues,
Colonized aboriginal peoples such as Indians in Canada were bypassed by the 
‘wave’ of third-world liberation from colonialism following the Second World 
War. Now, there is a new wave of liberation building worldwide. This time 
the energy is coming from ethnically defined ‘peoples’ who, not unlike 
Indians in Canada, are trapped against their will within the borders of larger
• 92nation-states.
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is still being debated in the
89 ibid
90 Reynolds. H. Aboriginal Sovereignty. Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1996 p. 171
91 Reynolds. H. Aboriginal Sovereignty, Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1996 p. 163
92 Reynolds. H. Aboriginal Sovereignty, Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1996 p. 174
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Commission for Human Rights (CHR), which comprises representatives of 53 
governments. The Australian Government has taken the following position on the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
Ministers have recently considered the Australian Government’s approach to 
the negotiations on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
They confirmed Australia’s continued participation in the Working Group on 
the Draft Declaration in order to promote the development of an instrument 
which is broadly consistent with national interest and with domestic policy and 
legislation.94
It is likely that the CHR will be less sympathetic to indigenous peoples aspirations as 
framed in the Draft Declaration.95 Whatever the outcomes of these debates it is 
important to consider them in the context stipulated by the Principles of Internal Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States. These principles will 
guard the perimeter of any advantages gained by Aboriginal peoples.
Australia’s domestic interpretation and application
How then has Australia’s domestic policy translated the international interpretation of 
self-determination? One of the most common criticisms of self-determination as 
practiced in Australia is lack of definition. Pat O’Shane comments, “the Left... simply 
embracing self-determination without actually defining what is meant by it is 
definitely a major problem”.96
The Whitlam Government, from 1972 to 1975, introduced self-determination as a
93 Indigenous Legal Issues. Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft. LBC Information 
Services, Second Edition. Sydney 1997 p. 475
94 United Nation’s Working Group on Human Rights, 3rd Session October-November 1997 p.22
95 Indigenous Legal Issues. Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim, Laura Beacroft. LBC Information 
Services, Second Edition. Sydney 1997 p. 475 95 Neill, R. “The debate we don’t dare have”, The 
Weekend A ustralian April 24-25 pp. 22-23
96 Neill, R. “The debate we don’t dare have”, The Weekend Australian April 24-25 pp. 22-23
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policy option for administration in Aboriginal affairs. In enunciating the rhetoric of 
this policy, Whitlam spoke of the reversal of “two hundred years of despoliation, 
injustice and discrimination” and declared that the objective of his Government was to 
“restore to the Aboriginal people their lost power of self-determination in economic, 
social and political affairs”.97 But as Robbins argues, the underpinning concepts of 
rights and equality were never clearly elaborated, leaving the context in which the 
policy was to be implemented essentially vague.98
Bennett suggests there are at least two definitions for this term: the politicians’ 
definition and the literal definition preferred by most Aboriginal people.99 
Government applications of self-determination, between 1972 and 1996, have been 
built upon exercises that incorporate Aboriginal involvement into existing structures 
which then assign roles and responsibilities consistent with power-sharing 
arrangements. According to government, these practices represent Aboriginal 
ownership and control over their own decision-making processes. It is seen to give 
effect to self-determination as a policy of practical application as opposed to a policy 
of theoretical abstractions.
These practices have produced a range of Aboriginal organisations delivering social 
services, major ‘peak body’ structures such as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission of which elected representation is a central component of the 
organisation, and Native Title Representative Bodies. Other examples include
97 Robbins, E. Self Determination or Welfare Colonialism: Aborigines and Federal Policy-Making. 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Flinders University, South Australia. May 
1994 p. 129
98 ibid
99 Bennett, S. White Politics and Black Australians. Allen & Unwin 1999 p.195
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Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committees and National Park Joint Management 
Committees. All of these mechanisms and many others not mentioned provide 
opportunities for Aboriginal people to make comment and participate in Australia’s 
social, political and legal institutions. To assess the consistency of these practices 
with the HRC interpretation of self-determination, the appropriateness of these 
mechanisms in meeting Aboriginal demands of greater control are essentially 
irrelevant. This is not to undervalue the inadequacies of infrastructure and services to 
Aboriginal people and communities that government and non-government reports 
continue to identify, this paper could not do those issues justice. The question to be 
asked here is are these practices in line with the development o f participatory 
democracy, and do they reflect efforts to achieve full equality for minority groups? 
The answer to this question is that they do.
The Queensland Legislative Standards Act 1992 reflects the comments of the HRC. 
This Act is an attempt to ensure that legislation before the parliament is consistent 
with ‘fundamental legislative principles’ that seek to protect the rights and liberties of 
individuals and the institution of parliament. These requirements test new legislation 
and are therefore significant in shaping the way in which laws are framed in 
Queensland. For the protection of Aboriginal interests, the Legislative Standards Act 
1992 seeks to ensure that new legislation has sufficient regard to Aboriginal tradition. 
As articulated during the second reading, the Legislative Standards Bill was 
encapsulating Westminster democracy.
The groups that suffered most when Westminster democracy arrived in the 
colony of New South Wales-the groups that lost almost all-were the indigenes. 
In Queensland, these groups are the Aborigines and Islanders. Whites,
... might celebrate the British tradition of democracy; they have nothing to 
celebrate. This Bill injects into the drafting of legislation in Queensland
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consideration for Aboriginal tradition and Island customs.100
It seems rather naive to suggest that the consideration of Aboriginal tradition within a 
Westminster system, can restore to Aboriginal people ‘what was lost’, when, as stated 
above, it was these very same people who suffered most when this western system of 
democracy was introduced. It holds the belief that despite the distinct cultures, values 
and interests of Aboriginal people, in the broad consensus of the values that underpin 
Australia’s political institutions they are considered in common.
For example, in relation to cultural heritage practices, the recognition of ‘traditions 
and customs’ is an initiator for arrangements of co-management with the state.
Within these practices there is an opportunity for Aboriginal people to manage these 
areas on their own. What is interesting in the management transfer is that this can 
only eventuate when Aboriginal people themselves are sufficiently operative in non- 
Aboriginal land management practices. The recognition o f ‘traditions and customs’ 
has somehow become irrelevant. It would appear that the application of sufficient 
regard to Aboriginal tradition is used as a mechanism to include Aboriginal people 
into consultative process regarding issues that impact upon them. Unfortunately, the 
initiation of processes, which primarily account for and reflect the notion of 
procedural fairness, does not equate with the recognition of Aboriginal people as 
Aboriginal people.
As Justice Mathews determined during the review of the Hindmarsh application, the 
most fundamental inadequacies can be found in the attempt of an introduced 
European common law system to protect these rights without recognising Aboriginal
100 Parliamentary Debates Queensland Legislative Assembly 21 May 1992 p. 5505
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legal systems. To reapply this theme, if the Westminster system of democracy and 
law secures the rights and liberties of individuals, where does the balance of justice lie 
for a people whose systems are founded upon the rights of the collective.
There is a common belief that a Westminster system is appropriate to accommodate 
Aboriginal interests and that Aboriginal representation within such a system can only 
be advantageous for Aboriginal people. To give a hypothetical example surrounding 
the Hindmarsh Island incident, if the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs had been a 
woman and supported an application for protection, it would have been difficult for 
the Minister to state the reasons why such protection was afforded. It would not have 
been possible for the Minister to ask male members of the House to leave because of 
the content of explanation. Can such a system truly allow Aboriginal values to 
operate? Despite these observations, the practices themselves are reflective of 
international understandings of what self-determination demands.
An Aboriginal critique
As suggested by Bennett, some Aboriginal people have a more literal understanding 
of what self-determination requires. Brennan makes the point:
There is now a domestic meaning of self-determination which connotes more 
than self-management. It incorporates the notion that indigenous 
organisations and representatives should be able to shape policy for their 
people and not simply manage government programs, run co-operative 
enterprises and administer local government functions for communities which 
happen to be indigenous.101
As discussed in Chapter 3, Aboriginal ownership and control over decision-making 
processes is key to Aboriginal empowerment, an aspect also supported by the Royal
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Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. For self-determination, the ability to 
freely determine and freely pursue is likewise a key element. To set up an Aboriginal 
critique of existing practices under the rhetoric of self-determination, a definition for 
self-management makes an important point of contrast. Jull describes self­
management as,
... a delegated function whereby a group or some type of formal authority 
carries out tasks with funds and program design determined by others outside 
the group or region. A welfare office on indigenous land may be staffed by 
local people and may hand out the cheques and carry out other welfare 
functions within the guidelines of a higher authority.102
The collective content of lull’s definition of self-management and the HRC 
interpretation of self-determination would suggest that the distinction between the two 
is determined by the level at which Aboriginal activity in institutional frameworks 
occur. Using Galligan’s description of political culture, How do you change the 
outcomes o f structures without changing the values that design them? If self- 
determination is to be placed as an apparatus within the nation state and be directed by 
the values of the nation state, there can be no reality for Aboriginal interpretations of 
self-determination. Having Aboriginal representation in participatory fora does not in 
itself reflect Aboriginal requirements for self-determination. As Robbins argued, the 
irony of imposing a cultural notion of representation in the name of “self- 
determination” seems to have eluded the government.103
The above descriptions and lull’s definition of self-management, in particular the
102 Juli, P. The Politics of Northern Frontiers. Australian national University. North Australian 
Research Unit. Darwin 1991 p. 54
103 Robbins, E. Self Determination or Welfare Colonialism: Aborigines and Federal Policy-Making. 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Flinders University, South Australia. May 
1994 p.131
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reference to a higher authority implies that self-determination can only proceed under 
self-management practices. When Aboriginal people practice this understanding of 
self-determination, they themselves become ‘brokers’ or ‘Aboriginal experts’ for 
government agencies. By operating within government and not Aboriginal 
institutions, Aboriginal people, as mentioned earlier, insulate government from the 
pressure of conflict. They themselves accept and identify with the definitions that 
‘outsiders’ have imposed on Aboriginal people. As ‘Aboriginal experts’ they then 
mediate this definition to Aboriginal people and communities, and construct their 
relationship to government in this image. In this practice ‘Aboriginal experts’ are 
both ‘captives and captors’ of an image constructed by others outside the group.104 As 
a tool for co-option and containment it is most effective.
Yet despite the knowledge and habits Aboriginal people have gathered about the 
operations of these ‘inclusive’ models, they persistently seduce us. This may be a 
reflection of the relationships of power between black and white in Australia; it may 
also reflect an urgency to embrace what we perceive as ‘new’ at the expense of our 
own cultural and historical baggage. Lois O’ Donoghue, former Chairperson of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, gave this expression of self- 
determination,
The report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
underlined its recommendations with a call to governments to give greater 
effect to the principles of self-determination. This will entail the recognition 
by governments that we are distinct peoples within the Australian nation, and 
we do have collective rights. Self-determination as a concept is not something 
which can be tacked onto program design or introduced through piecemeal 
consultation. It has to be accepted as a policy objective that pervades the 
relationships of indigenous peoples to the wider community.
104 Hart, V. unpublished paper 1996
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Clearly, aspirations of self-determination have broadened considerably both 
for governments and among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples in 
the past decade. We now see in the power-sharing arrangements of our 
federalist system, and in the variety of forms of community and territorial self- 
government which it incorporates, further opportunities for Aboriginal peoples 
to more fully participate in determining their own affairs within the Australian 
community.10
The interesting feature of these comments is the movement away from rights to 
participation. Having Aboriginal people managing or participating in mainstream 
institutions does not necessarily mean that the deficiencies of those practices are made 
inoperative. To use a theme argued by Fanon, the reality of such practices indicate 
that Aboriginal people have simply inherited the legacy of these institutions.106 
Likewise, Higgins comments about the idea of self-determination as the right to 
determine ones’ own destiny, and not to have it imposed, falls away against the 
experiences of Aboriginal people in Australia. The outcome of Aboriginal 
participation in mainstream institutions under existing arrangements can be nothing 
else but imposed.
Although this participatory expression of self-determination has appeal to many black 
and white Australians, there are some that do not consider current practices as a true 
expression of self-determination. All that has been achieved over the years is that the 
former domination by white pastoralists and missionaries has been replaced by 
domination by white public servants and employees.107 As other commentaries have 
noted, the practice of institutional assimilation obscures this reality. This practice,
105 O’ Donoghue, L. “Australian Government and Self-Determination” in Aboriginal Self- 
Determination In Australia. Fletcher, C. (ed). Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra. 1994 p. 4
106 (cited in) The Human Rights Reader, (ed) Micheline Ishay. Routledge, New York. 1997 p. 313
107 (cited in )107 Bennett, S. White Politics and Black Australians. Allen & Unwin 1999 p.141
108 See Collmann, J. “Clients, Cooptation and Bureaucratic Discipline”, Social Analysis 9. 1981 p.49 
and Cowlishaw, G. Black. White or Brindle. Race in rural Australia. Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press 1988 p. 135
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which has facilitated their own frustrations, is a significance influence for raising the 
question of why self-determination is failing. As Neill states,
Most Australians are aware that the money and good intentions channelled 
into Aboriginal affairs during the past 30 years or so are having little tangible 
effect on indigenous well-being and want to know why. Many people -  black 
and white -  no longer believe indigenous disadvantage can be exclusively 
blamed on white oppression.109
Such comments are certainly simplistic and reflect the popular critiques of self- 
determination. Firstly, there is the emphasis that money and ‘good intentions’ are 
sufficient criterion to alleviate ‘Aboriginal disadvantage’. Secondly, the lack of 
success from Aboriginal participation within mainstream funding institutions coupled 
with ‘Aboriginal management’ of the welfare dollar, are considerate enough for 
mainstream Australia to disown Aboriginal disadvantage as an outcome of 
colonisation and to place it as a phenomena that exists within Aboriginal people. The 
articulation of these views by Aboriginal people themselves, are commonly heard in 
statements such as ‘things are better for us now than they were fifteen years ago’. The 
problem with such statements is that the primary source of legitimacy for the concept 
of disadvantage is withdrawn. Disadvantage maintains its legitimacy through the 
comparative analysis of social indicators among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people. However, when we evaluate the gains amongst ourselves we eliminate this 
comparison and claim ownership for ‘disadvantage’, as a phenomenon that exists 
within Aboriginal people. Although this ownership sits quite comfortably with the 
current and popular urgings o f ‘responsibility’; it offers little towards a greater 
understanding of these issues at the source.
109 Neill, R. “The debate we don’t dare have”, The Weekend Australian April 24-25 pp. 22-23
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The comments of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, identified 
that Aboriginal circumstances were perpetuated and institutionalised within the social, 
legal and political frameworks of the Australian state. Yet a critique of the values that 
design such structures has gone amiss in the analysis of public policy in Aboriginal 
affairs. This allows for simplistic explanations despite an accepted knowledge that the 
label of oppression white australia would like to discard, and the ‘disadvantage’ they 
wish to share with Aboriginal people, operates in subtle ways.
For example, when One Nation spoke about its policies for Aboriginal affairs, they 
were described as racists, even though the policies themselves were framed around the 
rhetoric of equality and ‘all australians’. That is, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people should all be treated the same. Under existing practices, Aboriginal people 
have seen the establishment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 
which apart from an elected arm, operates like any other bureaucracy. In cultural 
heritage issues, the Queensland Aboriginal Land Act 1991 enables Aboriginal people 
to claim land. Successful claims can be leased back under co-management 
arrangements with the state. However it is non-Aboriginal land management practices 
that dominate these arrangements. There has also been a growth of Aboriginal 
organisations many of which mirror mainstream organisational structures. The 
programs these organisations deliver to communities are likewise similar to programs 
accessed by non-Aboriginal people apart from the obvious colour scheme of service 
delivery. In all of these practices there already exists a trend of conformity, for 
Aboriginal people to operate in a like manner to non-Aboriginal people. What then is 
the difference in outcomes between One Nation’s policies promoting the rhetoric of 
equality and ‘all australians’ and those of current practices? Only the process. It is
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ironic that while there appears to be no middle ground in the views both sides of the 
political fence advocate, there is substantial common agreement in the premise from 
which such disparate views are articulated. It clearly reflects Anderson’s comments 
about the shared political philosophy this discourse operates within.
As outlined in chapter 1, the influences that have shaped contemporary Aboriginal 
circumstance are both historical and systemic in origin. It is therefore necessary that 
any serious discussion about the failure of self-determination to positively respond to 
these issues must also include an examination of how these influences are dealt with. 
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody identified that non­
recognition of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people led to an historical process of 
disempowerment which then led to the development of assimilationist practices. 
Australian Government policies and practices, including the role of Aboriginal 
‘brokers’, have attempted to redress these circumstances by responding through the 
very structures which shaped and created these circumstances. That is, Aboriginal 
people use the same institutions that deal with these issues for non-Aboriginal people. 
As described in chapter four, simply because a commonality of issues can be 
determined, it does not necessarily mean the causes which shaped such circumstances 
are similar. Such a practice is indefensibly and contrary to its public rhetoric. 
However, in the eyes of the HRC, these practices are consistent with the conditions 
conducive for self-determination to proceed, for all peoples.
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Chapter &. Conclusion
Governments cannot take our rights away; they can only reduce our capacity to enjoy
them110
This dissertation has the unenviable task of selling a problem. As commented by 
Hewson in Chapter One, the outcomes of government efforts, by both the major 
political parties, have performed well below expectation without adequate 
explanation. The critique offered in this paper suggests that explanations for 
consistent failure are more informative when the values used to determine ‘Aboriginal 
problems’ and subsequent government action are examined. As illustrated in 
Chapters Two and Four, the confusion in differentiating between causes and 
symptoms reflects an emphasis upon processes not structures, an emphasis on the 
content of policy, not the context. Subsequently, current evaluation strategies explore 
the relationship between the rhetoric of expected change and the program. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, evaluation theory suggests the focus would be better 
placed upon the rhetoric of expected change and the problem so that policy learning 
can occur. The evaluation outcomes conducted by the former model, has developed 
an industry rich in resources looking for solutions. But little attention, has been given 
to understanding; what is the problem'?
The arguments presented in this paper have explored the relationship between 
government action and the problem as perceived by governments and many 
Aboriginal people alike. The methodology used to conduct this examination is 
grounded in history and Aboriginal experience. As identified by the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, issues such as land, education,
110 Collins, L. unpublished manuscript
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employment, housing and substance abuse did not appear in a vacuum. They are 
interrelated and interconnected. But the influences that operate laterally to link these 
issues have yet to be redressed. If these issues are products of non-recognition, 
disempowerment and assimilationist practices then surely such influences must 
represent the underlying issues. Any response, which does not directly impact upon 
these influences, is symptomatic and allows the dispossession to continue.
Non-recognition: eg. terra nullius
However, raising the level of debate will be no easy task. Responding to the 
symbolism that Australia’s societal institutions promote, represents the single largest 
hurdle Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people have yet to confront. Allied with this 
symbolism is a discourse of authenticity that facilitates Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal discussion and limits not only the articulation of Aboriginal interests, but 
also how these interests are understood. As discussed in Chapter Two and Three, if
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the values this discourse upholds are mainstream, there can be no place for an 
Aboriginal context. In such a setting Aboriginal people may well ask do we really 
speak English?
This dominance of mainstream values is not surprising and should be accepted as a 
natural development given the improbability that white australia could divorce itself 
from its own cultural values and assumptions in responding to issues confronting 
Aboriginal people. The irony is, as demonstrated in previous chapters; this is exactly 
what Aboriginal people are asked to do in the participatory arrangements that have 
evolved under the rhetoric of self-determination. While Aboriginal people continue to 
be considered in an ‘all australian’ context, terra nullius social policy will continue to 
meander through legislative frameworks as identified by Mathews. It will maintain 
our interest at the periphery and beyond, rather than attempting to understand how did 
we get here?
Over the last few years a range of solutions have been put forward for Governments, 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people to consider. While it is not possible to study 
these proposals in depth, a general overview of where the problem is located is 
sufficient to assess what some have to offer.
Geoffrey Partington has suggested that, “advocates of separatism should look afresh 
at the results of their own policies and at the assimilationist case they often 
contemptuously dismiss without thought”.111 Apart from the colour scheme of service 
delivery, there is very little to suggest that separatist policies have been tried. It is
Partington, P. Hasluck versus Coombs, Quakers Hill Press. Sydney. 1996 p. 153
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true that the processes for delivering services has changed, but the values that 
designed the structures these processes operate within have not altered. Rather than 
rebuild Australia’s institutional frameworks, office re-fits are considered far more 
appropriate. The inclusion of Aboriginal people within mainstream institutions 
illustrates this point.
Partington’s distinction o f ‘separatist’ is largely identified through the existence of 
programs or policies for Aboriginal people and programs and policies for all other 
Australians. It is premised by the belief that Aboriginal people should not consider 
themselves anything other than ‘all australian’. Such a scope of analysis is too 
limiting to provide adequate explanation for failure. Of course the assumption being 
made here is that assimilation failed to adequately address the causes of Aboriginal 
circumstance during the era this policy was ‘officially’ applied. Partington would 
argue that under assimilationist policies the 1950s and 1960s were decades of greater 
Aboriginal progress than those of the 1980s.112 But as argued by Rowse, the practice
113of assimilation conferred rights more easily than it engineered new social forms.
To clarify this point, the rights conferred were mainstream not Aboriginal. That is, it 
was easier to confer Aboriginal access to rights and entitlements mainstream Australia 
considered appropriate for all Australians, rather than endorse the rights and 
entitlements consistent with a status that recognises Aboriginal people as Aboriginal 
people.
With a preoccupation on content and process, structures and values are considered
112 Partington, P. Hasluck versus Coombs. Quakers Hill Press. Sydney. 1996 p. 65
113 Rowse, T. “Indigenous Citizenship and Self-determination: The Problem of Shared 
Responsibilites”, in Citizenship and Indigenous Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & Will Sanders. 
Cambridge University Press 1998 p.98
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irrelevant elements in Partington’s critique. It is ironic that when these elements are 
introduced into the analysis, the ‘separatist’ practices criticised by Partington are 
likely to be the most successful practices of assimilation Aboriginal people have 
encountered.
Noel Pearson has recently argued that it is welfare dependency for which solutions 
must be sought. The argument presented by Pearson attributes this social condition to 
overlapping and uncoordinated responses by government in the delivery of services. 
Pearson’s arguments also locate the problem at the level of the recipient, using the 
liberal rhetoric of individual responsibility and the Aboriginal practice of reciprocity. 
From this point Pearson makes a distinction between positive and negative welfare 
which immediately undermines the consistency of argument against welfare 
dependency. That is, some welfare dependency is good, some bad. But even this 
distinction is further reduced until it is understood that negative welfare refers to 
social security payments. It is a reductive theory of explanation for a symptom not a 
cause and is further illustrated in Pearson’s comments that,
“.. .the provision of income support to able bodied working aged adults 
without reciprocity is the source of our social problems and the starting place 
for any solutions”.114
Aboriginal people may well ask whatever happened to dispossession and terra 
nullius? The reductive nature of Pearson’s comment is inconsistent with an argument 
proposing to eliminate welfare dependency. It is the conditions created by welfare 
dependency that the above comment addresses not the influences that create the 
dependency.
114 “From Cape York to Campbelltown -  Rebuilding Communities”, The Brisbane Institute 26th July 
1999
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Basically, the argument is circular. For example, in forums addressing Aboriginal 
deaths in custody, it is said that if economic development on Aboriginal communities 
is successful, people would have better jobs, get better housing, have better health, 
which would lead to greater benefits from education and lower incarceration rates. 
Government representatives who work in health have argued that, if health is 
improved the benefits o f education will also improve which means people will obtain 
better jobs, live in better houses and reduce incarceration rates. Dependent upon 
which symptom is considered dominant the general argument has popularity.
Solutions premised by these strategies treat history and Aboriginal experience as 
irrelevant tools for policy analysis. The outcomes o f such analysis situate problems in 
contemporary settings from which the liberal rhetoric o f individual responsibility can 
rationalise the circumstance. The encroachment of restorative justice strategies is 
indicative of this statement.
Another inconsistency in the proposal put forward by Pearson is the location o f the 
problem at welfare dependency. The full participation of Aboriginal people in social 
welfare legislation is a relatively recent phenomenon. As described by Gray,
...up until the 1940s the social welfare legislation contained specific exclusions 
relating to Aboriginal people. From 1941 child endowment did become 
available for Aboriginal people who were not ‘nomadic’ or whose child was 
not ‘wholly or mainly dependent upon the Commonwealth or State for 
support. From 1942 maternity allowance and age and invalid pensions also 
became available to Aboriginal people who were ‘exempt’ from the laws of 
their State or territory relating to Aboriginal people, or where no such 
provisions for exemption existed, were judged by the Director General o f 
Social services to be of sufficient ‘character, standard of intelligence and 
development. From 1944 this last phrase was also used, theoretically at least,
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to allow some Aboriginal qualification for unemployment and sickness 
benefits. However, the general rule was still exclusion and the numbers of 
Aboriginal people being paid under these exceptional provisions during the 
1940s was extremely small.115
If the intention of welfare was to abate these circumstances, then the issues that need 
to be redressed were prevalent long before the full participation of Aboriginal people 
in social welfare legislation.
The arguments of individual responsibility are also inconsistent. It was governments, 
and not Aboriginal people, that identified the problems to which social welfare 
legislation would address. Nor were Aboriginal people ‘involved’, until recently, in 
the formulation of the content in social welfare legislation. Thirdly, Aboriginal 
people did not ‘control’ the processes of implementation of this content. As argued in 
previous chapters, the frames of reference used to respond to issues impacting on 
Aboriginal people have always been white. The argument asserted here is that 
dependency is built into the system, as opposed to a development initiated by 
Aboriginal people. It is simply inappropriate for Aboriginal people to claim 
ownership for welfare dependency on the back of recent tokenistic relations with 
governments and their agents. Pearson himself argued
It has become patently obvious that the passivity and disempowerment of our 
welfare condition is, together with racism and the legacy of our colonial 
dispossession, the fundamental causes of dysfunction in our society.116
Yet despite this acknowledgment, key aspects of the fundamental causes of
115 Gray, G. “From Nomadism to Citizenship: A P Elkin and Aboriginal Advancement” in Citizenship 
and Indigenous Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & Will Sanders. Cambridge University Press 1998 
p.64
16 “From Cape York to Campbelltown -  Rebuilding Communities”, The Brisbane Institute 26th July 
1999
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dysfunction as suggested by Pearson, have escaped the attention of his own proposal. 
It would appear that Pearson’s argument has adopted the definition of welfare 
dependency used by the Aboriginal Employment Development Policy, which equated 
welfare dependency to unemployment benefits. 117 As commented by Altman and 
Smith the definition is somewhat narrow. 118 In the holistic response that Pearson is 
arguing for, solutions must redress those fundamental causes of dysfunction. Yet the 
only alterations proposed amount to technical administrative adjustments within 
existing frameworks to establish an interface for Aboriginal and government 
negotiations. Whilst such arrangements will have symbolic significance, they 
ultimately retain the management paradigms identified by Caiden. Against a 
methodology of history and Aboriginal experience, such solutions will continue to 
substitute symptoms for causes, leaving ‘the fundamental causes of dysfunction in our 
society’, unattended. As argued by Mulgan, “With the passing of time, the question 
of the legitimacy of a regime turns less on its origins than on its present behaviour” . 119
Chesterman and Galligan have argued that possibilities for the advancement of 
Aboriginal rights rest in three key areas: the development of the common law on 
Aboriginal rights; the possibility of a negotiated treaty; and constitutional reform. 120 
The opportunity to advance Aboriginal rights within common law is in stark contrast 
with the findings of Mathews, history and Aboriginal experience. How can 
Aboriginal people assert their rights as Aboriginal people when the common law fails 
to recognise Aboriginal legal systems? Under these conditions, the protection of
117 Altman, J. C. & Smith, D.E. Estimating the reliance of Aboriginal Australians on welfare: some 
policy implications. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research No. 19/1992 p .l
118 ibid
119 Mulgan, R. “Citizenship and Legitimacy in Post-colonial Australia” in Citizenship and Indigenous 
Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & Will Sanders. Cambridge University Press 1998 p .l86
120 Chesterman, J. & Galligan, B. Citizens without Rights. Cambridge University Press, 1997 p. 216
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Aboriginal rights and interests afforded under the common law system can only be 
conditional. For example, it has been claimed that the recognition of customary law 
under native title had significantly altered the relationships between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people in Australia. McLaughlin argues that the recognition of 
customary law under native title is only a tool that is used by anthropologists to 
describe Aboriginal people, for a white judge in a white legal system to make a 
determination about whether such rights exist.121 Under this description, the 
determination gives effect to those rights only through the order of a court and not the 
customary law right.122 The recognition of customary law is therefore subordinate to 
mainstream law. Australian history, mostly written and described by non-Aboriginal 
people, consistently illustrates how the rights and interests of Aboriginal people have 
always been subordinate to mainstream. Where then is the significant change in this 
relationship?
Working through a treaty or constitutional reform is a more appropriate vehicle for 
consideration, because both have the capacity to change the nature of the relationship 
between Aboriginal people and the federal government. Whereas the judiciary will 
never undermine its own authority, the legislature does have the authority to recognise 
Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people and act upon this recognition. Consequently, 
the opportunities to establish a national framework that can influence local responses 
can be achieved. As Jull comments;
...the development of systems relevant to and manageable by local indigenous 
communities involves the transfer of authority to indigenous entities at both 
local and national levels. Experience elsewhere in OECD countries suggests 
that the two produce the best results when proceeding in tandem. That is, it is
121 McLaughlin, R. “some problems and issues in the recognition of indigenous customary law” 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin. Vol. 3 No. 82 July 1996 p.5 
ibid122
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local authority which is needed to actually improve individual lives, but 
national influence or direct power is needed to create the conditions and the 
frameworks for local power to be transferred.123
To many, this statement would appear contradictory to the arguments expressed 
previously. Many would argue that seeking the recognition of Aboriginal people as 
Aboriginal people from the legislature is reflective of the same devolved system of 
power-sharing arrangements criticised earlier. The earlier descriptions of devolved 
power-sharing arrangements placed Aboriginal people within existing institutional 
arrangements or through new umbrella institutions governments themselves have 
established, eg. ATSIC, for the ‘benefit’ of Aboriginal people. The recognition sought 
in this paper refers to the authority and legitimacy of Aboriginal legal systems to 
operate under their own direction rather than act as components of mainstream 
institutional frameworks. This should not be confused with a secessionist movement 
seeking political sovereignty. Rather, the intention of this ‘framework’, for want of a 
better term, is seeking the recognition of Aboriginal cultural sovereignty. It is seeking 
the formal recognition of Aboriginal institutions and authority at the national level so 
that Aboriginal communities at the local level can freely determine their own 
aspirations under the direction of their own systems. Regardless of how Aboriginal 
people choose to obtain this recognition, the reality that there has to be an interface 
cannot be avoided. It would seem appropriate that such a meeting take place at the 
point where mainstream values are initially activated; the institutional arrangements of 
the Australian State. Reynolds states:
The unique status sought by Aboriginal people and Islanders relates to their 
membership of the first nations, not to special rights acquired from the state. 
They are citizens of the state, not of the nation; theirs is a civic, not an ethnic, 
loyalty. But the paradox is that their commitment to the state may be enhanced
123 Juli, P. Australian Nationhood and Outback Indigenous Peoples. North Australian Research Unit, 
Australian national University, Darwin. 1991 p.21
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by the fact that it alone can underwrite and protect indigenous nationalism and 
self-government from inimical forces both within Australia and without.124
However, such an arrangement can never occur in isolation of other changes. Apart 
from the recognition of Aboriginal legal systems Aboriginal people need to consider 
issues such as, constitutional protection and guarantees, land rights in full, the 
elevation of Aboriginal issues as a national issue to remove the confusion of shared 
responsibilities as a result of the 1967 referendum and new financial arrangements 
between Aboriginal people and the federal government. More knowledgable people 
than myself would make further contributions to ensure a consistency this cultural 
recognition requires. To put this into some kind of context, there are numerous 
Commonwealth and State Acts and Regulations that make specific reference to 
Aboriginal people in Queensland. These legislative frameworks have impact on 
issues such as, health, education, housing, employment, environment, law and justice, 
land, local government, fisheries, forestry, aged care and children. To state the 
obvious, they impact and set conditions upon Aboriginal lifestyles. The passive 
context in which Aboriginal ‘traditions and customs’ are ‘considered’ in these 
legislative frameworks, negates real opportunities for Aboriginal people to practice 
their law within the application of existing legislation. Australian federalism can 
accommodate such recognition.
If sovereignty could be divided one way in 1901 there can be no reason, in 
principle, why it cannot be cut again to create a new level of government that 
would allow Aboriginal and Islander communities to run their own internal 
affairs in ways already apparent in the external territories of Cocos-keeling, 
Christmas and Norfolk Islands.125
124 Reynolds, H. “Sovereignty” in Citizenship and Indigenous Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & 
Will Sanders. Cambridge University Press 1998 p. 214
125 Reynolds, H. “Sovereignty” in Citizenship and Indigenous Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & 
Will Sanders. Cambridge University Press 1998 p. 213
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Arguments against such recognition and the arrangements needed to secure them, 
contain the very sentiments identified as the primary problem in responding to 
‘Aboriginal’ issues. That is, the only interface that can exist between black and white 
is one dominated by the terms and conditions set by white australia. The fundamental 
task in this paper has been to acknowledge the negative impact of white frames of 
reference that describe Aboriginal people for appropriate inclusion in white 
institutions.
Another argument against such arrangements is the assertion that such a framework 
sanctions apartheid practices. Apartheid practices are popularly understood as the 
application of separate laws between peoples on the basis of race, one law for ‘them’, 
one law for ‘us’. But apartheid practices are more than just having separate laws for 
the purposes of separate development. They are founded on an action by the 
dominant cultural/political group to withdraw rights and entitlements from other 
members of the citizenry on the basis of race. It is the management of citizens under 
racial categories for the purpose of excluding those rights and entitlements to be found 
in the status of ‘citizen of the state’. For example, excluding Aboriginal people from 
the right to vote was an apartheid practice. The framework being suggested seeks the 
recognition of Aboriginal people as Aboriginal people and the subsequent rights and 
entitlements consistent with that status, which exceed the offerings of Australian 
citizenship. Consequently, how can an arrangement that recognises Aboriginal 
cultural sovereignty be accused of apartheid practices when the rights recognised for 
Aboriginal people are rights white Australians don’t have in the first place?
The issue o f ‘cultural diversity’ will also promote arguments against a national
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framework. Many academics and interested writers of Aboriginal studies would 
probably disagree with attempts to initiate a process, which is seen to be creating 
commonalities amongst Aboriginal people. For example Morse comments;
Writing about the condition of Aboriginal People in broad terms fails to 
disclose the brutal impact of the processes of colonization, economic 
destabilization and acculturation...Generalities also mask the diversities that 
exist, as well as the cultural, political and economic revival that has begun in 
Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal People are not all the same nor do they 
all face the same problems.126
This view expressed by Morse represents the general description of what cultural 
diversity is and the appropriate policy response to accommodate it. However, it is a 
response, which fails to recognise that unity can be expressed through diversity. The 
description by Morse relies upon markers identifying different needs and concerns, 
different historical experiences, different socio-economic backgrounds and 
geographic location. The problem with this perception o f ‘cultural diversity’, is that it 
polarises Aboriginal experiences as separate events, isolated and independent. It 
excludes the most obvious observation that from the first day of colonisation, 
Aboriginal people have lived a shared social experience.
Regardless of geographic location, historical experience, contemporary needs and 
concerns or socio-economic backgrounds, Aboriginal people across this country have 
felt the impact of white systems of governance and the practices of non-recognition 
applied to their own. Despite the wide literary recognition, the markers currently used 
to identify ‘cultural diversity’ ignore the commonality of this event. These markers 
only reflect the consequences of this event and mirrors current evaluation practices of
126 Morse, B. Aboriginal Peoples and The Law: Indian, Metis, and Inuit Rights in Canada. Carelton 
University Press. Ottawa Canada 1991 p. 12
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starting from the periphery and extending outwards. It is another contribution to the 
confusion in differentiating between causes and symptoms.
The introduction of Christianity to Aboriginal communities will offer some clarity to 
this analysis. Diggs argued that because there were many Aboriginal laws and 
languages it was not possible to speak in general terms about Aboriginal 
spirituality. This is a descriptive explanation of what is seen; not an informative 
explanation of what is understood. Cowan illustrates that when ‘guardians’ spoke 
about land and law there was a consistency among the principles being applied.128 
These included land and law are one, the importance of human participation and 
responsibility and the importance of this relationship to the present reality.
Regardless of geographic location these principles were applied. What Diggs 
described as diversity was the regional variation and application of shared principles 
and appears to be unable to distinguish between the foundations of individual group 
customs and key principles that inform Aboriginal law.
Current understandings of cultural diversity have retained this theologian critique. It 
is a practice, which has positioned the influence of cultural diversity as a negative, 
rather than as a positive expression of Aboriginal lifestyles. The question needed to 
be considered is how to design policies that not only accommodate Aboriginal 
cultural diversity, but also recognise and deliver Aboriginal authority. Establishing a 
process of policy formulation, which is based on identifying key principles, may be 
seen as standardising the Aboriginal response to individual issues.
127 Diggs, M. “Missionaries & Cross Cultural Situations”, Compass Theology Review. Vol.27, Spring 
1993
128 Cowan, J. Sacred Places in Australia. Simon & Schuster, New South Wales 1991
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On the contrary, it is a response, which standardises the recognition of Aboriginal 
authority that will allow individual communities to apply what they consider to be 
appropriate responses to particular issues. It will enhance diversity, not mask it. The 
task ahead for Aboriginal peoples in Australia is to move the issue of cultural 
diversity into a positive expression of Aboriginal values. This can be achieved with 
the recognition that there are key principles and events which underpin and unite 
Aboriginal people. If policy makers are to avoid the ad hoc practices of the past, then 
the drafting of new policy must accommodate diversity, not be formulated by it.
This dissertation has argued and demonstrated that the failure of mainstream 
approaches to redress Aboriginal circumstance originates not at the level of 
implementation, but in the methodology and context in which problems themselves 
are framed. Despite the acknowledgment of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody that issues such as land, education, economic development and 
health are all interrelated, there has been little attempt by public policy analysts to 
redress the influences that maintain this constant interaction. Consequently, 
governments have relied upon the symbolisms and rhetoric of their own cultural 
assumptions to persevere with ‘well intentioned’ but symptomatic ambitions.
In pursuit of Johnston’s definition of empowerment, governments at all levels need to 
understand that it will not be achieved until Aboriginal communities can secure 
authority over issues that directly impact upon them. This entails accountability not to 
governments, but to the Aboriginal community. Increasing responsibility to 
government without authority will only produce negative outcomes for the community 
and the programs, which are imposed upon them. Firstly, it will create false
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expectations as to what outcomes the community can realistically achieve. Secondly, 
without authority, indigenous communities will become dependent upon the program 
and bureaucratic mechanisms, which operate it. Thirdly, Aboriginal participation will 
decline when it is realised that the community's initial expectations cannot be met. 
Therefore, a program originally intended to increase Aboriginal responsibility and 
participation as an administrative bridge from dependency towards ‘a measure’ of 
autonomy will only create further dependency and frustration, unless the community is 
recognised as having authority, ownership and control of its own agenda. Anything 
other than community initiative and control falls into the area of outside imposition - 
no matter how well meaning.129
It is therefore not just the physical acts of government responses to issues confronting 
Aboriginal people that need to be re-thought; it also requires a rethink of how these 
issues are framed for policy responses. Robbins comments,
Participants in the policy process may see the problems facing Aborigines as 
disease or discrimination rather than a dilemma of liberal theory. But notions 
of rights, freedoms and the relationship between the individual and the state 
are crucial ingredients of the way in which Aboriginal rights are framed as a 
policy issue.00
It has been demonstrated that ‘Aboriginal’ issues have been framed within the same 
mainstream values that direct the provision of social, political and legal institutions
129 Sykes, R. “Self-determination: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy Makers”, In Justice 
Programs for Aboriginal and other Indigenous Communities: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Fiji, 
Papua New Guniea. Proceedings from Aboriginal Justice Workshop No. 1 (ed) C. Hazelhurst. 
Australian Institute of Criminology 1995 p. 27
130 Robbins, E. Self Determination or Welfare Colonialism: Aborigines and Federal Policy-Making. 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Flinders University, South Australia. May 
1994 p.10
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and practices for all Australians. Operating in this ‘all australian’ context, a politics of 
non-recognition has been maintained.
Bureaucratic indifference thus shielded the state from both accountability and 
the responsibility to do more than react half-heartedly, in a patronising and ad 
hoc way, to a situation imbued with elements of racial and cultural genocide.
In a general sense this neglect was indicative of the collective exclusion of 
indigenous people, on racial and cultural grounds, from the colonial 
community and the resulting consequential socio-political location outside its 
boundaries of a great many individuals identifiable as Aboriginal. However, it 
also facilitated the inclusion of many Aboriginal people within the boundaries 
of the body politic, but their inclusion was conditional upon the erasure of 
their difference.131
This description by Wood of Australian colonial and commonwealth government 
policies from the mid nineteenth to the mid twentieth century is very much consistent 
with the analysis of current practices presented in this paper. It is the nature of the 
relationship; the context in which choices are to operate that creates the inequality that 
Aboriginal groups confront. 132 It is therefore the context of this relationship that 
needs to be changed.
History and Aboriginal experience are very much forgotten tools of policy analysis in 
Aboriginal affairs. Excluding these aspects reduces the understanding of these issues 
to a contemporary context that can only describe symptoms. It provides half the 
solution to half of the problem. Alleviating ‘Aboriginal’ disadvantage can only be 
redressed by responding to both the causes and symptoms. To carry out one in 
isolation of the other will perpetuate deficient explanation for ‘well intentioned’
131 Wood, M. “Nineteenth Century Bureaucratic Constructions of Indigenous Identities in new South 
Wales”, in Citizenship and Indigenous Australians, (eds) Nicolas Peterson & Will Sanders. Cambridge 
University Press 1998 p. 50
132 Robbins, E. Self Determination or Welfare Colonialism: Aborigines and Federal Policy-Making. 




A framework built upon the recognition of Aboriginal cultural sovereignty is possible 
and practical within Australia’s federal structure. However, the current political and 
popular climate to ‘leave the past behind us’ means it will not be an easy task.
Against this prevailing Australian pioneering spirit, Aboriginal people, policy analysts 
and government need to keep in mind that the difficulty of the task does not make it 
impractical, only difficult.
If Aboriginal people can only see themselves through the eyes of mainstream social, 
legal and political institutions, then we ourselves will perpetuate the myths they have 
about us. If we continue to stand in front of white mirrors accepting white 
explanations for ‘Aboriginal’ problems, failings and solutions then we will only see 
distorted reflections. The only honesty to be seen in these images is that Australia has 
never truly departed from the Benelong experiment. A true reflection of Aboriginal 
realities can only be achieved in a context that recognises Aboriginal people as 
Aboriginal people. However, under existing arrangements the only equality 
mainstream Australia is prepared to offer us, is theirs.
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